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I. THE PROBLEM OF PATERNITY1 
The term “traditional nuclear family” conjures up images of a family 
unit comprised of a husband and wife living together under one roof
with their genetic children.2  In an age of single parent households,3 
homosexual parentage,4 and medical innovation allowing for assisted 
1. The focus of this article is on paternity determinations. Although issues of paternity
arise far more frequently, issues of maternity have also vexed the courts.  See SARAH H.
RAMSEY & DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS, CHILDREN AND THE LAW IN A NUTSHELL 66–68 (2003).
In American states that recognize homosexual domestic partnerships or legalized gay
marriage, courts have been asked to intervene when the family unit dissolves.  In such 
situations, a woman other than the child’s primary legal mother (i.e. birth parent, genetic 
parent or adoptive parent) may be found to be an additional legal mother.  E.g., Elisa B.
v. Super. Ct., 37 Cal. 4th 108 (2005) (holding that a lesbian woman who agreed to have a 
child with her partner who was artificially inseminated and who actively parented the 
child was a parent of the child); Kristine H. v. Lisa R., 117 P.3d 690 (Cal. 2005) (holding 
a woman who had signed a parentage stipulation was estopped from attacking it).
Additionally, advances in assisted reproduction technology also present challenges in
determining who qualifies as the legal mother of a child.  E.g., In re Marriage of 
Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Ct. App. 1998) (holding that a married couple who had
intended to have a child created through donor sperm and egg and gestated by a surrogate 
were parents in spite of a total lack of genetic or gestational relationship to the child).
Germany has faced similar issues.  Germany bans joint adoption of children by non-
married individuals, though one of the two partners can adopt as an individual.
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code] § 1741(2), available at http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.ed/bundesrecht/bgb/gesamt.pdf.  In contrast to the strict rules for stranger 
adoption, the rules for stepparent adoption allow same-sex domestic partners to adopt the
children of their partners. DAS GESETZ ÜBER DIE EINGETRAGENE LEBENSPARTNERSCHAFT
[Domestic Partnership Act], Feb. 16, 2001, BGBl. I at 266, § 9(1), http://bundesrecht. 
juris.ed/bundesrecht/1partg/gesamt.pdf. 
In Germany, the most difficult problems of defining motherhood occur in issues of
surrogacy. Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code] § 1591 defines the mother as the 
woman who gives birth to the child, regardless of genetic relationship or intent.  This is a 
statutory rule that cannot be altered by the parties, so if a woman wishes to use a surrogate to
have a child, the surrogate will be deemed the legal mother and the intended mother will
have to adopt the child in question in order to be deemed its legal parent.  See generally
DIETER SCHWAB, FAMILIENRECHT [Family Law] 244 (C.H. Beck 15th ed. 2007). 
2. RAMSEY & ABRAMS, supra note 1, at 47. 
3. As of 2007, 25.8% of American children were living with just one parent. 
Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, 50 Million Children Lived with Married Parents in 
2007 (July 28, 2008), http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/ (select 2008
from “Releases by Year”, then select “July” from “Releases by Month for 2008,” follow 
hyperlink to press release).
4. There are currently no reliable statistics on gay and lesbian parents as the United
States Census Bureau has only recently begun to address the issue.  Nevertheless, it is 
clear that homosexual parentage is widespread and there is at least one homosexual parent in
almost all American counties.  Joan Biskupic, Same-sex Couples Redefining Family Law
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reproduction,5 this is often not the case.6 The modern family has genetic,
emotional, functional, and social elements that both compliment and 
conflict with each other.7 Nevertheless, in defining the legal relationship
between a man and a child in terms of parental authority, financial 
responsibility, and visitation rights, courts and legislatures have fashioned
rules predicated on either proof of genetic paternity8 or the principal 
functional-social aspects of the family relationship.9  This either-or 
approach clearly serves a court’s interest in efficiency, but it does so by 
sacrificing some elements of the complex, multi-faceted parent-child 
relationship.10 
When a jurisdiction uses the either-or approach,11 there can be only 
one man who is legally defined as the father12 even if the child has an 
in USA, USA TODAY, Feb. 17, 2003, at 1A, available at http://www.usatoday. com/news/
nation/2003-02-17-cover-samesex_X.htm. 
5. A striking example of the disjuncture between biology and legal parenthood
occurs in cases where the sperm, egg, and gestational mother are all unrelated to the 
intentional parents.  E.g., In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 293. 
In Germany, the child would be legally deemed to be the child of the woman who gave 
birth to him, regardless of intent or genetic relationship between the parties.  SCHWAB, 
supra note 1 (discussing the implications of Section 1591 of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch). In
order to change the legal status of the child with respect to the intended mother, an 
adoption would have to take place.  Id.  If the husband’s sperm were used, he could 
become the legal father through adoption or by simply voluntarily acknowledging the
child.  Id. No such acknowledgement procedure is available to the intended mother. Id.
6. The United States Supreme Court expressly recognized that”[t]he demographic
changes of the past century make it difficult to speak of an average American family.”
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000). 
7. See generally Janet L. Dolgin, Genetic Evaluations:  Blood, Genes, and Family, 21
AKRON L. REV. 347 (2008); Angela Campbell, Conceiving Parents Through Law, 21 
INT’L J.L. & POL’Y & FAM. 242 (2007). 
8. See, e.g., State ex rel. Hermesmann v. Seyer, 847 P.2d 1273, 1279 (Kan. 1993)
(holding that a twelve-year old boy could be made to pay child support to older
babysitter who had initiated an inappropriate sexual relationship with him as he was the
genetic father of the resulting child). 
9. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (finding the marital 
relationship between one putative father and the child’s mother determinative even where 
another putative father was undisputedly the genetic father and had maintained a 
relationship with the child).
10. While all courts have an interest in efficient determination of the issues before 
them, efficient determination of paternity is most evident in the probate context. E.g., In
re Estate of Burden, 146 Cal.App.4th 1021, 1027 n.2 (2007); Estate of Griswold, 25 Cal. 
4th 904, 923–24 (2001). 
11. Almost every American jurisdiction approaches paternity in an either-or 
fashion, which is the preference stated by the plurality opinion of the Supreme Court in 
Michael H., 491 U.S. at 131.  Louisiana alone has specifically disavowed that approach 
and acknowledged a concept of “dual [legal] paternity.”  T.D. v. M.M.M., 730 So.2d 873, 875
n.2 (La. 1999). 
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active parent–child relationship with more than one man.13  Once legal  
paternity is established, the legal rights and responsibilities of other men
are terminated.14 Often this means that a child will not have an
opportunity to build or sustain a relationship with the excluded father.15 
It can also prevent the child from obtaining useful genetic information
that the genetic father could provide.  Thus, the either-or approach often
cuts off relationships between fathers and children where another man’s 
paternity is legally preferable. 
In Germany, the either-or approach to paternity creates a particularly 
acute constitutional conflict.  The Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik 
12. Justice Scalia rejects the notion of dual paternity stating “the claim that a State 
must recognize multiple fatherhood has no support in the history or traditions of this 
country.”  Michael H., 491 U.S. at 131 (emphasis added). 
13. Id. at 114–16. 
14. See id. at 131. 
15. This was precisely the outcome of the decision of the Superior Court in the 
Michael H. case even though the excluded father was both the genetic father and a man 
who had acted as father (with the mother’s consent) during the child’s lifetime.  Michael 
H., 491 U.S. at 119.  Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion does nothing to rectify this, 
though Justice O’Connor’s concurrence sees the issue of legal parenthood and visitation
as two separate issues. Id. at 132–33. (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
American states are divided on the ability of a genetic father to challenge the marital
presumption. Compare Barnes v. Jeudevine, 475 Mich. 696 (2006) (holding that a 
genetic father has no standing to challenge the marital presumption even where he signed 
an affidavit of parentage and his name was on the birth certificate) with In re Paternity of
S.R.I., 602 N.E.2d 1014 (Ind. 1992) (holding genetic father is allowed to establish
paternity if petition is timely filed and he puts on clear and convincing evidence to rebut 
the presumption of legitimacy of the child born to a married mother).
In Germany, “[t]he right to free development of personality and the commitment to
respecting and protecting human dignity are secured under Article 2, Paragraph 1, in 
conjunction with article 1, section 1 of the Basic Law.” Vaterschaftstests [Paternity Tests]
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [German Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 2, 
2003, 117 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] 202, 225 [hereinafter
Vaterschaftstests].  This case is available for download directly from the German Federal 
Constitutional Court, which publishes its decisions on its official website.  BVerfGE, 1 BvR
421/05 vom 13.2.2007 [Feb. 13, 2007], Absatz-Nr. (B-I-59), http://www.bundesverfas
sungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rs20070213_1bvr042105.html. All decisions from January 1,
1998, to the present are available on the site. 
This right is also protected to by the European Convention on Human Rights and implied
by the protections afforded Children in the European Convention on the Rights to the
Child.  Samantha Besson, Enforcing the Child’s Right to Know Her Origins:  Contrasting 
Approaches Under the Convention on the Rights of the Child and The European
Convention on Human Rights, 21 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 137, 142–43. 
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Deutschland, the German Constitution (Basic Law)16 places high value 
on the sanctity of the family and protection of children, imposing
mandates on the state requiring affirmative protection of the family
structure17 and affirmative state action to ensure a child’s right to be 
financially supported by his or her parents.18 The Basic Law also 
contains an individually-held “personality” right to control one’s genetic 
information.19  The personality right has been deemed to include a right 
to know one’s genetic heritage, a concept that is not solely backward
looking.20  In terms of the personality right protected by Article 2 of the
Basic Law, an individual has a right to know not only his or her ancestry,
but also a right to know if his or her genes have been passed on to 
offspring.21  In the context of the modern family structure, this right to 
know information on one’s offspring comes into conflict with the other 
parent’s constitutionally-protected right to keep sexual history private.22 
Additionally, an individual’s right to know and control his own genetic 
information may conflict with another individual’s right to remain in 
ignorance of his genetic information.23  Because of the conflicts between 
these competing constitutional rights, Germany legally barred fathers
from conducting clandestine paternity tests.24 
The ban on clandestine paternity tests left a doubting father with no
effective way to exercise his right to know if he has genetic offspring in 
cases where the mother objected to testing of a child, as evidenced by the
16. The Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany has been in force since 
May 1949.  Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [GG][Basic Law] May 23, 
1949, BGB1. I 2248 at Präambel [Preamble]. 
17. Article 6 of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany provides that 
the state must affirmatively protect marriage and the family.  GG arts. 6(1) & 6(2).
18. German parents have a constitutional obligation under Article 6 of the Basic 
Law to nurture and care for their children. Id. art. 6(2). 
19. The German right of “personality” is protected by Article 2 of the Basic Law. 
Id. art. 2. 
20. “Understanding and development of ones individuality is closely linked to 
knowledge of the underlying factors that make up one’s individuality.  This includes genetic
origin.” Vaterschaftstests, supra note 15, at 225//BVerfGE, 1 BvR 421/05 at Absatz-Nr. 
(B-I-59). The United Kingdom and Switzerland also protect the right to know as an 
absolute right of the child.  Besson, supra note 15, at 139. 
21. Vaterschaftstests, supra note 15. 
22. Vaterschaftsauskunft [Paternity Inquiry] Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] 
[German Federal Constitutional Court] May 6, 1997, 96 Entscheidungen des
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] 56 (268–69) [hereinafter Vaterschaftsauskunft] (rights
of genetic mother invaded when child wishes to force her to name her genetic father).
23. Id. 
24. Vaterschaftstests, supra note 15, at 240//BVerfGE, 1 BvR 421/05 at Absatz-
Nr. (B-III-92). 
514
KAMEI (DO NOT DELETE) 5/5/2010 11:37 AM      
 
   
 
  


























      
 
    
 
[VOL. 11:  509, 2010] Partitioning Paternity 
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
2007 decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht25 (Federal Constitutional
Court) in the case of Herrn S.26 As part of its decision, the Federal 
Constitutional Court ordered the national legislature to craft a solution 
that would effectively protect families and children while serving the 
underlying rights of all parties to the greatest extent possible.27 The
German government28 responded by bifurcating the proceedings relating 
to paternity into a process to clarify a child’s genetic origin29 and a
25. The German Federal Constitutional Court is an independent and autonomous 
branch of the German government located in Karlsruhe.  Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz 
[BVerfGG][Code Regulating the Federal Constitutional Court] arts. 1(1), 1(2); It is
regarded as co-equal to the legislative and executive branches. See GG arts. 20 & 92. 
Unlike the United States Supreme Court, its sole function is judicial review of 
constitutional matters and resolution of disputes between the various state and federal
branches.  BVerfGG art. 13; GG art. 93. Thus, it is not a “super-appellate” court. 
The highest court for civil appeals within Germany is the Bundesgerichtshof.  GG art. 
95; Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz [GVG][Court Organizational Statute] § 133; see also
website of the Bundesgerictshof [Federal Court of Justice], http://www.bundesgerichtshof.de/
(select “Der BGH”, then select “Aufgabe, Organisation”).
Note that there are some instances where a German court can certify an unresolved 
question of European law material to a case before it to the European Court of Justice.
Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union 2008/C 115/01 art. 267, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en.index.htm (select 
“Treaties”).  See also Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [German Federal Constitutional 
Court] Oct. 14, 2004, 11 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] 307
(discussing the implications of a decision by the Third Section of the European Court of
Human Rights on their own decision), English translation available at http://www.
bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen.html (select the English Version by clicking on
the Union Jack Flag symbol, then select “Decisions”, then select, “Oct.” on the 2004
line, then scroll down and select “2 BvR 1481/04”); Mattias Hartwig, Much Ado About 
Human Rights: The Federal Constitutional Court Confronts the European Court of
Human Rights, 6 GERMAN L.J. 869; http://www.germanlawjournal.com/index.php?page 
ID=11&artID=601. 
Further information on the Bundesverfassungsgericht [German Federal Constitutional
Court] can be found at its website, http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en (select 
“Organization”) [English version]. 
26. Vaterschaftstests, supra note 15. 
27. Id. 
28. GESETZ ZUR ERGÄNZUNG DES RECHTS ZUR ANFECHTUNG DER VATERSCHAFT
[LAW SUPPLEMENTING THE RIGHT TO CHALLENGE PATERNITY], Mar. 13, 2008, BGBl. I 
Nr. 9 at 313 [hereinafter Law Supplementing the Right to Challenge Paternity],  available at
http://www.bgbloportal.ed/BGBL/bgbl1f/bgbl108s0313.pdf. 
29. The process to clarify the genetic origin of a child is a Klärungsverfahren
[Anspruch auf Klärung der Abstammung] [Clarification Proceeding].  Press Release,
Budesministerium der Justiz [German Ministry of Justice], Gesetz zur Vaterschaftsfestel lung
























     
 
   








separate process to challenge legal paternity.30  Thus, a doubting father31 
can exercise his right to know if his legal child is his genetic offspring
without simultaneously eviscerating the rights of the child and mother 
and without putting existing legal relationships at risk.32 
This paper will address the strengths and weaknesses of the German
approach as well as the potential use of this approach by American
states, with particular emphasis given to the conflict between the right to 
know one’s origins and a child’s right to care and support. Part II 
discusses the challenge of defining legal paternity in an age of genetic
certainty.  It will first give a brief explanation of how courts have used 
functional–social and genetic considerations in defining legal paternity.
It will then evaluate the legal implications of this approach on the rights
of the father, mother, and child. 
Part III evaluates the special issues raised in the German system,
where the constitutional mandates to protect the family structure and the 
right of a child to support33 conflict with constitutionally protected 
individual personality rights.34  It also discusses the conflict between the 
rights of the father, mother, and child inherent in the German system. 
Part IV discusses the case of Herrn S.,35 wherein the German Federal 
Constitutional Court ordered the legislature to create a process to protect
legal paternity but allow for the determination of genetic paternity.  This
is followed by an overview of the legislative response that effectively
bifurcated paternity proceedings in the German courts.36 
Part V evaluates the alternative avenues that the German legislature
could have taken, focusing on the feasibility of such solutions in the 
German context.  This includes a discussion of the discrepancies
between a father’s right to test and a mother’s right to test, the potential 
30. The process to challenge paternity is an Anfechtungsverfahren [Paternity Contest]. 
Id.
31. The decision allows only the legal father to bring a challenge, the rights of a 
mere genetic father can be much more proscribed. Vaterschaftstests, supra note 15,
at 238//1 BvR 421/05 at Absatz-Nr (B-II-89).  The new statutory section of the Family
Code includes provisions that allow the process to be initiated by (1) the father against 
the mother and child; (2) the mother against the father and child; or (3) the child against 
both parents.  BGB § 1598(a). 
32. Bringing a procedure to clarify genetic origin has no impact on the legal status
of the father.  Vaterschaftstests, supra note 15, at 239//BVerfGE, 1 BvR 421/05 at 
Absatz-Nr (B-III-91). 
33. GG arts. 6(1), 6(2). 
34. GG art. 2. 
35. Vaterschaftstests, supra note 15. 
36. Law Supplementing the Right to Challenge Paternity, supra note 28, at 313. 
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to vest power to test in a neutral third party, and, the potential for
mandatory testing at birth.
Part VI analyzes the gaps in the new German law and potential 
solutions to the resulting problems.  These problems include lack of 
uniformity in testing standards and lack of effective punishment for men 
who continue to conduct secret DNA tests.  In addition, I discuss the 
continuing tension between the rights of the parties as well as the high
evidentiary burden placed on fathers who wish to challenge paternity. 
Part VII discusses the exportability of the German approach to the 
American context and compares the German approach to the alternative 
concept of dual legal paternity.37 Part VIII concludes with a comparative 
discussion of how the German approach and the dual legal paternity
approach could be utilized in American jurisdictions. 
II. THE LEGAL CHALLENGE OF DEFINING PATERNITY IN THE AGE OF 
GENETIC CERTAINTY BASED UPON LAWS DEVELOPED IN AN
AGE OF UNCERTAINTY
In both Germany and the United States, the laws governing paternity 
begin with a strong presumption that the husband of a woman is the 
father of any child born to her (i.e., the marital presumption).38  When 
children are born out of wedlock, both systems allow for voluntary 
acknowledgment39 and judicial determination of paternity.40 Both systems 
37. See generally Melanie B. Jacobs, My Two Dads: Disaggregating Genetic and
Social Paternity, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 809 (2006) (discussion of the concept of dual paternity and
suggestions for implementation). 
38. The marital presumption in Germany is found in the statutory definition of
paternity.  BGB §§ 1592(1), 1594(2). 
In the United States, the marital presumption is a matter of state law, evolved from a 
common law doctrine to a binding statutory principle. See, e.g., Cal. Evid. Code § 621(a) 
(1995); Cal. Fam. Code §§ 7540–41 (2004). 
39. In Germany, a child born to a mother who is not married to the father at the
time of birth has no father. A man may acknowledge paternity under BGB § 1592(2). 
The consent of the child’s mother (or the child when the mother is not providing care) is 
required in order for a man to sign a voluntary declaration.  BGB § 1595.  The consent 
may be signed either before or after the birth of the child.  BGB § 1594(4). 
In the United States, the exact process varies from state to state. In California, a father
may also acknowledge paternity by being named on the child’s birth certificate (Cal. 
Fam. Code § 7540 (2004)) or by voluntarily signing a declaration of parentage (Cal. 
Fam. Code §§ 7570–77 (2004)). 
40. In Germany, a man may also be determined to be the legal father of a child by
a legal process pursuant to section 1600(d) of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [Civil Law Code].
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impose obligations on a father based solely on genetics, but do not grant
him any rights based on genetic ties alone.  Both systems also struggle 
with the legal rights of non-marital genetic fathers and the conflict of 
rights between mother, father(s), and child.41 
A. From the Bright-Line Marital Presumption to the           
Struggle to Identify Non-Marital Fathers 
In both Germany and the United States, the starting point for
determining legal paternity is the “marital presumption.”42  The marital
presumption states that the husband of the child’s mother is presumed to
be the genetic father of the child in absence of some exceptional 
circumstances.43  The presumption arose in an era when genetic paternity 
could not be scientifically determined with any level of accuracy and 
In the United States, the exact process varies from state to state.  In California, a man may be
declared legal father by a court and ordered to pay child support.  Cal. Fam. Code. § 7611(c) 
(2004).
41. In addition to the principal case discussed in this Comment (Vaterschaftstests, 
supra note 15) the German Federal Constitutional Court has addressed several issues related 
to paternity and paternity determinations. E.g., BVerfGE, 1 BvR 1620/04 vom 1.4.2008 [Apr. 
1, 2008], www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rs20080401_1bvr162004.html 
[German language version only], (finding that legal father cannot be forced to have contact 
with his offspring); BVerfGE, 1 BvR 1444/01 vom 29.11.05 [Nov. 29, 2005], www. Bundes
verfassungsgericht.de/en/decisions/rk20051129_1bvr144401en.html  [Official
English Translation] (evaluating the claim of the natural father of a child born 
illegitimate who challenges the adoption of that child by the husband of the 
child’s mother); Vaterschaftsanfechtueng BVerfGE, 2 BvR 696/04 vom 24.10.2006 [Oct. 24,
2006], www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rk20061024_2bvr069604.html 
[German language version only], (dealing with the effect of disproval of paternity where 
alleged father was a German national but mother of child was not). 
Similar issues arose in the United States.  Compare Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248
(1983) (finding that a genetic father did not have standing to protest the adoption of his 
child by the current husband of the mother because he had not been active in raising the 
child and was not part of the putative father registry) with Adoption of Kelsey S., 1 Cal.
4th 816 (1992) (finding that a genetic father who claims paternity of a child from an 
affair immediately after birth has standing where the married mother of the child wants 
to put the child up for adoption).
42. See BGB §§ 1592(1), 1594(2); Cal. Evid. Code § 621(a) (1995); Cal. Fam. 
Code §§ 7540–41 (2004). 
43. In general, “impotence, sterility, or non-access to the wife” are sufficient to
rebut the marital presumption. See Diane S. Kaplan, Why Truth Is Not a Defense in Paternity 
Actions, 10 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 69, 70, 73–81 (2000); Theresa Glennon, Somebody’s
Child: Evaluating the Erosion of the Marital Presumption of Paternity, 102 W. VA. L.
REV. 547 (2000).  Such factors will not rebut the presumption where there was consent 
by the husband to the conception.  See, e.g., People v. Sorensen, 68 Cal.2d 280 (1968) 
(holding that husband of mother had consented to artificial insemination and could be
forced to pay child support). 
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was thus designed to ensure that the child was financially supported44 
and to preserve the sanctity of the traditional family.45 
Where no traditional family exists, courts and legislatures have
struggled to set proper guidelines for determining paternity.  Traditionally, 
children born out of wedlock were treated as having only one legal 
parent.46  This resulted in the genetic father having no legal rights with 
respect to the children and the children having no legal rights with 
respect to the genetic father.47 
In the United States, this bias against illegitimacy began to change in 
the latter half of the twentieth century through action of courts and
legislatures at both the state and federal level.  During the late 1960s and
early 1970s, American courts, including the United States Supreme
Court, attacked this practice as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.48 
44. In the Basic Law [German Constitution], the rights of a child to care and
support, the duties upon parents to so provide, and the duty of the state to protect the 
family are part of the same article.  GG art. 6.
45. In finding that the preservation of the family was more important than the 
genetic father’s claim, Justice Scalia states that “‘[o]ur decisions establish that the Constitution
protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the Institution of the family is deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”  Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 
123–24 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
46. Both the Germany and the United States began grappling with these issues at 
about the same time.  See Sybille Buske, FRÄULEIN MUTTER UND IHR BASTARD: EINE 
GESCHICHTE DER UNEHELICHKEIT IN DEUTSCHLAND 1900 BIS 1970, [Miss Mommy and
her Bastard:  A History of Illegitimacy in Germany from 1900 to 1970] (Wallstein 2004); 
Michael Bohndorf, The New Illegitimacy Law in Germany, 19 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 299– 
308 (1970); Irwin J. Schiffres, Annotation, Discrimination on Basis of Illegitimacy as
Denial of Constitutional Rights, 38 A.L.R.3d 613 (1971); RAMSEY & ABRAMS, supra
note 1, at 48–49. 
47. For example, prior to the United States Supreme Court decision in Stanley v.
Ill., 405 U.S. 645 (1972), it was the practice of the State of Illinois to deem unmarried
fathers as unfit to raise their own children.  This standard applied only to unmarried 
fathers as all other types of parents were deemed fit unless proven unfit in a hearing.  Id.
See also RAMSEY & ABRAMS, supra note 1, at 48. 
48. See e.g., Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (holding that children born out 
of wedlock are constitutionally entitled to the same right of support as are children of
married parents); Stanley v. Ill., 405 U.S. 645 (holding that unwed father could not be 
presumed unfit to assume care over his children); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406
U.S. 164 (1972) (holding that children born out of wedlock who lived in an intact 
household with their unwed mother and father could seek recovery under the state’s
workers compensation law); Levy v. L.A., 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968) (holding that the 
Equal Protection Clause is violated by not permitting five children born out of wedlock 
to seek damages as a result of the wrongful death of their mother).  But see Matthews v.
Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976)  (holding that social security benefits could be denied to an 
illegitimate child where there was no communal household, no written acknowledgment
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In 1973, the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
(NCCUSL) directly addressed this issue by promulgating the Uniform 
Parentage Act (UPA).49  Faced with a rise in welfare costs and a failure
of fathers to pay child support to non-marital children, the federal 
government passed laws that defined fatherhood broadly enough to
encompass non-marital genetic fathers, providing them with a means of 
voluntarily establishing paternity and ensuring that they would be held 
legally responsible for the basic needs of their children if they do not
voluntarily provide for them.50 Thus, the American legal structure
evolved from one hostile to parents and children in non-marital families 
to one extremely protective of the rights of children born out of wedlock.
A similar process of evolution occurred in Germany.51  Prior  to  
unification, the laws of the Federal Republic (West Germany) moved
from hostility to non-marital families to strong protection of the right of
children born out of wedlock to be financially supported by their genetic 
fathers.52  The issue of non-marital children was raised again during the
unification process because the laws of the former German Democratic
Republic (East Germany) extended greater inheritance rights to non-
marital children than the laws of the Federal Republic.53  Consequently,
of paternity nor a judicial proceeding as the parents’ marital status was relevant to the 
child’s rights and obligations). 
49. Unif. Act on Parentage (1973).  The Act was revised in 2000, in response to
the tremendous changes in reproductive technology.  Unif. Act on Parentage (2000). 
50. Title-IV of the Social Security Act established a federal level apparatus concerned 
with child support and establishment of paternity.  42 U.S.C. §§ 651–52 (2003).  The law 
now requires mandatory DNA testing for paternity in certain cases (42 U.S.C. § 666(5)(B)(1)
(2003)); state laws mandating determination of paternity by judicial process (42 U.S.C.
§ 666(a)(5)(D)(ii) (2003)); and that states accept acknowledgment of paternity validly entered 
into in another state (42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C)(iv) (2003)).  Additionally, as a condition 
of receiving welfare benefits, a mother must now assign child support payments to the 
state to reimburse it for any welfare payments she receives.  42 U.S.C. § 649(29) (2003). 
51. The laws of the Federal Republic (West Germany) are the principal source of
concern since those laws govern the unified German state.
52. The German legislature addressed the issue of illegitimacy slightly before the 
United States in its reforms in 1969.  GESETZ ÜBER DIE RECHTLICHE STELLUNG
DER NICHTEHELICHEN KINDER [LAW CONCERNING THE LEGAL STATUS OF NON-MARITAL 
CHILDREN] Aug. 19, 1969 BGBl. I at 1243.  Caselaw on issues of equality between marital 
and non-marital children is still evolving.  See, e.g., BVerfGE, 1 BvL 9/04 vom 28.2.2007
[Feb. 28, 2007], Absatz-Nr. (C-II-77), http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/ rs20070228_
1bvl000904.html, [German language only], (holding that the legislature breached Article 
6(5) of the Basic Law by granting different durations for a maintenance claim to children
born in wedlock and those born out of wedlock). 
53. The East German Family Code made no distinction between marital and non-
marital (i.e. “illegitimate”) children.  DIETER MARTINY, INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LAW
260 (Mathias Reimann & Joachim Zekoll, eds. Kluwer Law International 2005). 
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when the two Germanys merged under the laws of the Federal Republic, 
the probate code was amended to prevent divesting of rights held by East 
Germans who had been born out of wedlock.54  Thus, the current legal 
framework in Germany protects non-marital children’s right to be
supported by their genetic fathers and their right to inherit property from
their genetic fathers.
Currently, both the German and American systems establish non-
marital paternity by either voluntary acknowledgment55 or judicial 
determination of paternity.56  Both systems also evidence a fundamental
disconnect between the responsibility that can be imposed on a genetic 
father and the rights a father can have based solely on genetic paternity: 
A father57 can have obligations of care and financial support placed on 
54. Id.
55. In Germany, a man may acknowledge paternity [Vaterschaftsanerkennung]
under Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] Buch 4 Familienrecht [Family Code] section
1592(2) (BGB § 1592(2)); see also SCHWAB, supra note 1, at 229–40, paras. 459–79. 
In the United States, the exact process varies from state to state. In California, a father
may also acknowledge paternity by being named on the child’s birth certificate (Cal. 
Fam. Code § 7540 (2004)) or by voluntarily singing a declaration of parentage (Cal. 
Fam. Code § 7570–77 (2004)). 
56. In Germany, judicial determination of paternity [Vaterschaftsfeststellungsurteil] is
allowed under Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] Buch 4 Familienrecht [Family Code] section 
1592(3) (BGB § 1592(3)); see also SCHWAB, supra note 1, at 240–43 paras. 480–86. 
In the United States, the exact process varies from state to state.  In California, a man 
may be declared legal father by a court and ordered to pay child support.  Cal. Fam. Code. 
§ 7611(c) (2004). 
57. The term “father” contains several elements and is generally broken down into
categories based on the certainty of the man’s “genetic”, “functional”, and “legal” relationship 
to the child. For example, California divides the genetic and functional aspects of fatherhood
into five distinct categories:
1. An alleged father is a man who may be the genetic father, but genetic paternity
has not been established; 
2. A genetic father, is a man who has been confirmed as the genetic father of a 
child, but who has not achieved presumed fatherhood status as defined in most 
state statutes (In re Zacharia D., 6 Cal.4th 435, 449, n.15 (1993));
3. A Kelsey father is a genetic father who acted promptly to assume his paternal 
obligations to the fullest extent possible, but is unable to attain presumed 
fatherhood status through no fault of his own (Adoption of Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 
4th 816 (1992)); 
4. A presumed father is a man who meets one of the following criteria and has 
not successfully rebutted the presumption of paternity:
a. He was married to the child’s mother at the time of the child’s birth or
the child was born within 300 days of separation (Cal. Fam. Code, § 7540
(2004));
b. He married the child’s mother after the child’s birth and is either named on
the child’s birth certificate or has a voluntary or court-ordered child 
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him solely on the basis of genetic paternity,58 but he cannot get rights in
court proceedings, such as adoption proceedings59 or juvenile dependency
proceedings,60 based solely on genetic paternity.61 While courts and 
legislatures have created complex schemes differentiating between types 
of fathers,62 there can be only one legal father.  Genetic fathers have
almost no rights over offspring born to a mother who is married to 
another man at the time of the child’s birth63 as the state’s interests are
best served by the efficient and unambiguous determination of “legal” 
paternity.64 
support obligation (Id.; Cal. Fam. Code § 7611(c) (2004)); He has 
lived with the child and held himself out as the child’s father (Id.; Cal.
Fam. Code § 7611(d) (2004)), or he and the mother have signed a 
voluntary declaration of parentage under Family Code §§ 7570–77 (2004). 
58. There are several policy considerations that underlie this practice, including: 
1. punishment of men who are deemed sexually irresponsible; 
2. assumption of risk by men who choose to have sexual relations with a 
woman other than their wife; and,
3. the child’s right to be financially supported. Jacobs, supra note 37, at 844–45. 
59. For example, in California adoption proceedings, a genetic father must have 
attained presumed father status before his consent is required in adoption proceedings. 
Cal. Fam. Code § 8604(a) (2004). 
60. For example, in California juvenile dependency proceedings:
Alleged fathers have the right to notice and an opportunity to show that they should be
granted presumed father status. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 361.2(b); California Rules of 
Court, Rule 1413(h); In re Alyssa F. 112 Cal.App.4th 846, 855 (2003).  They have no 
right to custody or family reunification services.  In re Zacharia D., 6 Cal.4th at 435. 
Genetic fathers have the right to notice and must be afforded an opportunity to show that 
they should be granted presumed father status.  The court has discretion to grant family
reunification services if it finds them to be in the child’s best interest.  In re Raphael P.,
97 Cal.App.4th 716, 726 (2002). 
Kelsey S. fathers have the right to notice and an opportunity to show that they should 
be granted presumed father status.  Adoption of Kelsey S., 1 Cal.4th at 816. Failure to 
grant a Kelsey S. father visitation and other reunification services is a violation of due 
process rights and state statutory intent. In re Julia U., 64 Cal.App.4th 532 (1988). 
Presumed fathers have full standing as well as full constitutional and statutory rights.
Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 311, 317, 319, 335, 337, 361.2, 366.21, 366.22, 366.26, 366.3; In 
re Jesusa V., 32 Cal.4th 588, 610 (2004); In re Jerry P., 95 Cal.App.4th 793, 804 (2002). 
61. While not as severely constrained, a child’s rights based on genetic ties alone 
are not absolute. See Kenntnis der eigenen Abstammung [Knowledge of One’s Genetic 
origin] Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [German Federal Constitutional 
Court] Jan. 31 1989, 79 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE]
256; Ehelichkeitsanfechtung [Action for Disavowal of Paternity] Bundesverfassungsgericht 
[BVerfG] [German Federal Constitutional Court] Apr. 26, 1994, 90 Entscheidungen des
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] 263. 
62. The California scheme delineated in note 57 is a typical example of a complex
state scheme. 
63. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 119–20 (1989). 
64. Ex rel. Hermesmann v. Seyer, 847 P.2d 1273 (Kan. 1993); In re Parentage of
J.S. v. Williams, 550 N.E.2d 257, 258 (Ill. App. 1990). 
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B. Rights and Interests Implicated by Paternity         
Determinations 
While courts and legislatures certainly have an interest in efficient
determination of legal paternity status, the primary difficulty with 
determining paternity based on a black-letter rule or upon a small set of
immutable factors is that many of the complex and conflicting rights and 
interests of the parties are lost in the process.  In order for paternity 
proceedings to adequately reflect the complexities of modern life, the 
rights and interests of the legal and potential genetic fathers, the rights 
and interests of the mother, and the rights and interests of the child must
all be balanced against each other and against the state’s interests in 
efficiency, preservation of the family structure, and in preservation of 
the child’s right to support. 
In almost all paternity proceedings, the rights and interests of legal
and potential genetic fathers are in conflict.  The typical case in both 
Germany and the United States involves a non-genetic father challenging 
the financial burdens imposed by legal paternity.65  This usually occurs 
in cases where the legal father alleges that he assented to legal paternity 
only because he was fraudulently induced into believing that the child in 
question was his genetic offspring and in cases where a child born to the
legal father’s wife was not their genetic offspring.66  In both types of
cases, the fathers allege that the true responsibility for the child lies with 
its genetic father.67 Accordingly, the legal father seeks to shift the
financial burden for the child onto the genetic father who may not want 
the burden of supporting his genetic offspring.
While not the primary focus of the paternity challenges mounted by
legal fathers in either system, an individual also has a right to control his 
65. “Cuckholded” fathers have attempted to raise legal challenges in both Germany
and the United States.  E.g., Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], XII
ZR 207/03 vom 29.3.2006 [Mar. 29, 2006], http://www.bundesgerichtshof.de/ (select
“Entscheidungen”, then select “Zugang zur Entscheidungsdatenbank des Bundesgerichtshofs”,
then from the “Kalendar” select “März 2006” and scroll to find the case) [German
language only] (denying father right to terminate parental status where wife was working 
as a prostitute at time of conception); In re Paternity of Cheryl, 746 N.E.2d 488 (Mass.
2001) (holding that man who had genetic evidence disproving paternity could not vacate 
a paternity judgment entered more than five years earlier).
66. See, e.g., In re Paternity of Cheryl . 
67. Id.
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own genetic information,68 and a right to procreative freedom,69 which 
taken together creates the subsidiary right to know the genetic origin of 
one’s legal offspring.70  Within this context, a potential genetic father
has the right to know whether or not he is a genetic father and has an
interest in knowing and supporting his genetic offspring.71 These
particular rights and interests are often in direct conflict with the rights 
and interests of the legal father with respect to the children in question, 
particularly where the potential genetic father seeks to interject himself
between the child and a legal father who wishes to continue to serve as
the child’s legal, functional, and social father.72 Hence, there are 
multiple points of conflict between legal and potential genetic fathers. 
68. The German government has only recently begun to put some teeth into this
privacy right by providing punishment for those who violate it, primarily in the form of 
fines. GESETZ ÜBER GENETISCHE UNTERSUCHUNGEN BEIM MENSCHEN [LAW CONCERNING
GENETIC TESTING OF HUMANS], July 31, 2009, BGBl Teil 1, Nr. 50, 2529. 
The United States lacks similar personal protection. See, e.g., Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 437
F. Supp. 2d 985 (E.D. Mo. 2006) (holding that cells at issue in the case had been given to 
the University by the patients as an inter-vivos gift and that neither the patients nor the 
researching professor had the right to transfer the samples); Greenberg v. Miami 
Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (S.D. Fla.2003) (holding that 
research participants retain no ownership of genetic materials they contribute for medical 
research); Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120 (1990) (holding that 
individual who was being treated by the University retained no ownership rights in his 
discarded cells).  Nevertheless, some courts do recognize the importance of control over 
information related to one’s genetic make-up.  As the Ninth Circuit has noted “[o]ne can 
think of few subject areas more personal and more likely to implicate privacy interests 
than that of one’s health or genetic make-up.”  Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley
Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1269 (9th Cir. 1998). 
69. The Supreme Court has never directly litigated on this issue.  The highest court
to address the issue was the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which 
rejected the plaintiff’s claim that the state’s paternity and child support laws violated the 
rights of men to choose not to produce.  Dubay v. Wells, 506 F.3d 422 (E.D. Mich. 
2007) (denying father’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim that the state’s paternity statutes violated
his equal protection rights and holding that the rational basis test would be applied to
state paternity laws).
70. The German Federal Constitutional Court ruled that visitation based solely on
a genetic connection cannot be forced upon an unwilling party. BVerfGE, 1 BvR 1620/04
vom 1.4.2008 [Apr. 1, 2008], www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rs20080401_
1bvr162004.html [German language only].
The plurality in Michael H. supports this view as Justice Scalia rejected the child’s
guardian ad litem’s opnion that the child’s best interest was served by a relationship with
the genetic father. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 110, 115 (1989).  Nevertheless, 
neither court has delineated what should happen when the genetic father and child both
want visitation but the mother raises an argument that it is not in the child’s best interest- 
particularly where it will damage her relationship with her current husband. 
71. Vaterschaftstests, supra note 15. 
72. The conflict was the root of the Michael H. decision. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 
110–15. 
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In addition to being in conflict with each other, the rights of the legal 
and potential genetic fathers are often in conflict with the mother’s rights. 
The mother has a vested privacy right in her sexual history that is
unavoidably invaded by any attempt by either a legal or potential genetic 
father to challenge her assertions about paternity.73  In addition, the
mother is often the physical custodian of the child and the guardian of 
his well-being, so the mother has an interest in protecting the child’s
privacy and the child’s right to be supported by (at least) two parents.74 
When legal or genetic fathers seek to force determination of genetic
paternity or to avoid the responsibility of legal paternity, the rights of the 
mother individually and her rights and interests as guardian of her child 
are always implicated. 
The child in question also has a fundamental right to control his own
personal information as well as a right to stability and support that is in 
conflict with the rights of his legal father, potential genetic fathers, and
his mother.  The right of a child to control his personal information 
includes the right to know his genetic origin.  As with challenges to
paternity brought by the legal father or potential genetic father, a child’s 
challenge to his mother’s word on his paternity necessarily invades his
mother’s right to privacy regarding her sexual history and may well 
invade the rights of the genetic father and other men who are implicated
in the paternity proceeding.75 Additionally, the right to know and control
one’s genetic information includes the implicit right to remain in 
ignorance and be left alone regarding the matter.76  Consequently, if
either the child or the potential genetic father(s) oppose testing, the
rights of both parties cannot be protected.  Either the right to know or the 
right to remain in ignorance must be sacrificed.  Finally, even in cases
where the facts are such that these rights are not in direct conflict, the
child at issue has a right to a stable home life and the right to support,77 
73. The brief of the German Women Lawyer’s Association [Der Deutsche 
Juristennenbund] in the case of Herrn S. expressed this concern. Vaterschaftstests, supra 
note 15, at 215–16//Vaterschaftstests, BVerfGE, 1 BvR 421/05 Absatz-Nr. (A-I-36 & 37).
74. Vaterschaftstests, supra note 15, at 233//Vaterschaftstests, BVerfGE, 1 BvR
421/05 at Absatz-Nr. (B-II-81). 
75. Id. at 233 //Absatz-Nr. (B-I-77). 
76. The decision of the Bundesgerichtshof [Federal Court of Justice] in the 
Vaterschaftstests case included an expression of concern for the child’s right to remain in
ignorance. Id. at 209–10//Absatz-Nr. (A-II-15). 
77. German parents have a constitutional obligation under Article 6 of the Basic 
Law to nurture and care for their children.  GG art. 6(2). 
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both of which may be jeopardized by a finding of genetic nonpaternity 
on the part of the legal father, particularly in cases where the genetic
father cannot or will not financially support the child.  So even in cases 
where all parties agree to paternity testing, there are downstream 
consequences that implicate the rights and interests of the child. 
The last area of conflict in paternity determinations is the conflict of 
the rights of the individuals with the interests of the state. While the 
custodial parent is the guardian of the child’s rights,78 the state has an 
independent interest in the paternity determination process.  States have
an interest in an efficient determination of paternity to avoid stress on 
the judicial and administrative systems.79  States also have an interest in 
the preservation of family structures in order to promote a healthy and 
productive society.80  Finally, states have an interest in the preservation 
of a child’s right to be fully supported by his parents, as the state often 
bears the costs when parents do not adequately support a child.81  For  
these reasons, there are intractable conflicts between and among the 
rights and interests of the parties to the action and of the state itself.
III. SPECIAL ISSUES IN THE GERMAN SYSTEM
Balancing the rights and interests of all parties is especially vexing in 
the German context.  German law and social mores tend to be more
restrictive than the United States on issues of family law and 
reproductive freedom.82  Additionally, the German state, at all levels of 
government, has an affirmative constitutional duty to protect the family
structure83 and to ensure the rights and obligations of parents.84  The  
German state also has a duty to protect the right of an individual to 
develop his or her own personhood,85 which includes a right to know and
control one’s own genetic information up to and including the right to
know one’s genetic origin and the genetic origin of one’s potential 
78. Vaterschaftstests, supra note 15, at 229//Absatz-Nr. (B-I-69).  In the United
States, the Supreme Court used the issue of control over a child’s rights to deny the father
standing to sue in the famous Nedow Pledge of Allegiance case.  Elk Grove Unified Sch.
Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004). 
79. RAMSEY & ABRAMS, supra note 1, at 58–59. 
80. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 131 (1989). 
81. Ex rel. Hermesmann v. Seyer, 847 P.2d 1273 (Kan. 1993); In re Parentage of
J.S. v. Williams, 550 N.E.2d 257, 258 (Ill. App. 1990).
82. See generally MARTINY, supra note 53, at 262. 
83. GG arts. 6(1) & (6)(2). 
84. GG art. 6(2).
85. GG art. 1(1). 
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offspring.86  European Union law reinforces this personality right.87 
Within this context, balancing of relative interests becomes even more
difficult than in the American system.
A. The Central Role of the Traditional Family in German Law 
In the United States, legal rights pertaining to the family structure and 
reproductive rights are negative rights (i.e. rights protected against 
interference by the state).88 This is not the case in many European 
nations where the state must take an active role in protecting the 
traditional family and the sociopolitical structure that supports it.  The 
result is both proactive policies of support for traditional families and
laws that bar practices detrimental to the traditional family structure. 
For example, France does not allow surrogacy.89  It bans postmortem
conception from sperm taken from a deceased individual, regardless of
whether or not he would have consented.90  In vitro fertilization and 
other similar techniques are restricted to stable heterosexual couples of 
reproductive age.91 These laws demonstrate that France’s pro-family 
policies are limited to a narrow, conservative notion of the “traditional” 
family. 
86. Vaterschaftstests, supra note 15, at 225// BVerfGE, 1 BvR 421/05, Absatz-Nr.
(B-I-58).
87. Besson, supra note 15, at 142. 
88. J. McGregor & F. Dreifuss-Netter, France and the United States: The Legal 
and Ethical Differences in Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART), 26 MED. & L. 117, 
126–27 (2007); see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (holding that 
there is a fundamental liberty interest in “establish[ing] a home and bring[ing] up
children” without state interference under the Fourteenth Amendment); cf. BVerfG, 1
BvR 691/03 vom 3.11.2005 [Mar. 11, 2005], Absatz-Nr. (13–24.), http://www. 
bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rk20051103_1bvr069103.html (holding that the state could not 
prevent parents from giving their child a first name that the local government had 
deemed a banned “last name” because it would be a violation of rights under Article 6(2)
of the Basic Law). 
89. McGregor & Dreifuss-Netter, supra note 88, at 120.  The ban applies to both
“full surrogacy (where the surrogate mother also provides oocytes) [and] partial surrogacy
(where the couple undergo IVF before transferring the embryo into the surrogate 
mother’s womb).” Id. If French citizens go abroad to employ a surrogate, the baby will
only have a legal French parent if the father’s sperm was used.  Id. In that case, the 
French father will be recognized as the legal father, but the legal mother will be the birth 
mother of the child whether or not she bears any genetic relationship to the child or has 
any desire or intent to play a part in its upbringing. Id.
90. Id. at 132.
91. Id. at 121. 
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German law similarly protects the “traditional view” of the family in 
its laws governing reproductive rights.  German law strongly discourages 
assisted reproduction.92  Surrogacy in all forms is banned outright.  The 
first section of Das Embryonenschutzgesetz (Act for the Protection of
Embryos) imposes criminal sanctions and fines for violations.93 
Additionally, surrogacy is forbidden under Das Gesetz über die 
Vermittlung der Annahme als Kind und über das Verbot der Vermittlung 
von Ersatzmüttern (The Law Concerning Adoptive Placement of a Child 
and Prohibiting Surrogacy).94 As a result of these two legal prohibitions, 
surrogacy contracts could never be enforced by a German court as they
would be deemed void ab initio.95  Thus, in the interest of protecting the
traditional family structure, German law prohibits practices that are legal
in the United States, including many that have gained a level of social
acceptance by the American public. 
In addition to general conservatism in reproductive matters, the 
German state highly values marriage, family life, and motherhood.  The 
Basic Law states that marriage and family are under the special protection 
of the state,96 as is the special role of the mother in a child’s life.97  These 
92. See SCHWAB, supra note 1, at 244, para. 487; MARTINY, supra note 53, at 262; 
see generally Andreas S. Voss, The Right to Privacy & Assisted Reproductive Technologies:
A Comparative Study of the Law of Germany and the U.S., 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 229 (2002). 
93. EMBRYONENSCHUTZGESETZ. [LAW PROTECTING EMBRYOS] BGBl. I 2001, S. 
2702. In contrast, semen donation is not as strongly regulated.  So long as the child has
another legal father, the man has no relationship to the child. SCHWAB, supra note 1, at 
245–46, para. 491). 
94. Das Gesetz über die Vermittlung der Annahme als Kind und über das Verbot
der Vermittlung von Ersatzmüttern [The Law Concerning Adoptive Placement of a Child 
and Prohibiting Surrogacy], Dec. 22, 2001, BGBl. I at 3174 (F.R.G.). 
95. Contracts that violate other laws are void under sections 134 and 138 of the 
Civil Code.  BGB §§ 134 & 138. 
96. GG art. 6(1).  In its entirety, Article 6 states:
1. Marriage and the family shall enjoy the special protection of the state.
2. The care and upbringing of children is the natural right of parents and a 
duty primarily incumbent upon them. The state shall watch over them in 
the performance of this duty.
3. Children may be separated from their families against the will of their parents 
or guardians only pursuant to a law, and only if the parents or guardians
fail in their duties or the children are otherwise in danger of serious neglect.
4. Every mother shall be entitled to the protection and care of the community.
5. Children born outside of marriage shall be provided by legislation with 
the same opportunities for physical and mental development and for their
position in society as are enjoyed by those born within marriage.
Official English Translation of the Basic Law by the German Bundestag available at 
http://www.bundestag.de/interakt/informationsmaterial_alt/fremdsprachiges_mat
erial/downloads/ggEn_download.pdf [PDF format].
97. GG art. 6(4). 
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provisions expressly include protection of the relationship between
parents and their children, whether legitimate or illegitimate.98 This
protection is not limited to guarding individual and familial rights from 
outside interference (i.e. a negative right).99  It is an affirmative duty of 
the government to take action to protect the family (i.e. a positive right)
that must be obeyed even when it conflicts with other governmental 
interests.100  For example, the Federal Constitutional Court overruled a
decision by German immigration officials to deny an application to 
extend a visa because the individual in question was the father of a 
German national and the child had a constitutionally protected right to 
the preservation of her family.101  Thus, the affirmative protection of the
family required by the Basic Law is so strong that it can override an 
otherwise valid state interest. 
One final difference between the German and American family law 
system involves the levels of government that are actively involved in
shaping paternity law. In the United States, family law matters are 
traditionally regarded as the province of the states, with the federal
government acting primarily through the power of the purse.102  In  
Germany, there is extensive federal government regulation of family
matters, including direct legislation on the issue of paternity.103  Sections
1592 through 1600 of the (federal) German Civil Code address the issue 
of paternity,104 covering such topics as the definition of father,105 
98. GG art. 6(5).
99. GG arts. 6(2) & 6(3).  Such protection also exists in the United States. Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (“The history and culture of Western civilization reflect 
a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. 
This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established 
beyond debate as an enduring American tradition.”).
100. GG arts. 6(1) & (2). 
101. BVerfG, 2 BvR 1001/04 vom 8.12.2005 [Dec. 8, 2005], Absatz-Nr. (B-I-15 through 
36), http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rk20051208_2bvr100104.html 
[German language only].  The combination of rights under arts. 6(1) and 6(2) means that 
development of the child, including spiritual development, that occurs through the nurturing
and protection of the family structure must be actively protected by the state.  (B-I-18).
102. One example of the difference is that determination of paternity is included in
the federal Civil Code in Germany.  BGB §§ 1590–1600.  In the United States, this is a matter
of state law.  E.g. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 215, 3172, 5604, 7550, 7551, 7555, 7570, 7573, 
7574, 7575, 7577, 7641, 7646, 7647, 7648, 7648, 17406 (Deering 2009). 
103. Book 4 of the [Federal] Civil Code is dedicated entirely to Family Law matters. 
BGB Buch 4. 
104. BGB §§ 1592–1600. 
105. BGB § 1592. 
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recognition of paternity,106 and legal challenges to paternity.107  When  
issues of family law develop in Germany, it is the German Parliament
that ultimately resolves the issue after due consideration of the decisions 
of the federal courts.108 
B. German Right to Informational Self-Control
One of the issues faced by the German Parliament when legislating on 
family law matters is the balancing of its duties with respect to the 
protection of the family (and motherhood) against the individual rights
expressly and impliedly guaranteed by the Basic Law.  The Basic Law 
provides an express constitutional right to “free development of
personality.”109  This right and the right to human dignity protected by
the first article of the Basic Law110 are often bundled with other rights to
offer broader constitutional protection than either right could provide 
106. BGB §§ 1594–98. 
107. BGB § 1600.
108. For example, in the case of Herrn S., the Federal Constitutional Court 
delineated all of the issues of concern and then mandated that the Bundestag [German 
legislative chamber] draft a law to resolve the issues within a specified time frame. 
Vaterschaftstests, supra note 15, at 243//BVerfGE, 1 BvR 421/05, Absatz-Nr. (C-I-100). 
109. GG art. 2 states: 
1. Every person shall have the right to free development of his personality insofar as
he does not violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional
order or the moral law. 
2. Every person shall have the right to life and physical integrity. Freedom of 
the person shall be inviolable. These rights may be interfered with only
pursuant to a law. 
3. Every person shall have the right to life and physical integrity. Freedom of 
the person shall be inviolable. These rights may be interfered with only
pursuant to a law. 
Official English Translation of the Basic Law, supra note 96. 
In the famous census cases, the Federal Constitutional Court determined that informational 
self-determination was implicitly a part of the right enumerated in Article 2 of the Basic 
Law.  Mikorzensus [Microcensus],Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [German Federal 
Constitutional Court] July 16, 1969, 27 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgericht 
[BVerfG] 1; Volkszählungsurteil [Census Case] Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE]
[German Federal Constitutional Court] Dec. 15, 1983, 65 Entscheidungen des
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] 1. 
110. GG art. 1 states
1. Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of
all state authority.
2. The German people therefore acknowledge inviolable and inalienable human 
rights as the basis of every community, of peace and of justice in the world.
3. The following basic rights shall bind the legislature, the executive and the
judiciary as directly applicable law.
4. The following basic rights shall bind the legislature, the executive and the
judiciary as directly applicable law.
Official English Translation of the Basic Law, supra note 96. 
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standing alone.111 Within this context, the Federal Constitutional Court
developed a concept of the “right to informational self-control.”112 
The right to informational self-control comes to play in many different 
legal contexts.113  It must be balanced against competing interests.114 For 
example, it protects the right of a transsexual to choose to go by a female
or a male name, regardless of actual “assigned” (i.e. legal) gender.115  It
protects the individual against dissemination of a technically manipulated
image that gives the impression that it is an authentic portrayal of the
individual.116  It also protects the right to know one’s genetic information.
The Federal Constitutional Court determined that the right to know 
one’s genetic origin is a distinct and essential part of the right of 
personality.117 In the opinion of the Federal Constitutional Court,
knowledge of genetic origin is central to development of individual
character.118  It is a right that the state must affirmatively protect.119 
Consequently, the state cannot place unreasonable limits on the right,
such as a two-year statute of limitations from attainment of majority that
effectively prevented many young adults from discovering their genetic 
heritage.120  However, this does not mean that the right to know one’s
111. Anke Freckmann & Thomas Wegerrich, THE GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM 88–89
(1999).
112. BVerfGE, 1BvL 19/63 vom 16. Juli 1969. 
113. For example, the Bundesgerichtshof [Federal Court of Justice] found that the
right of personality came into play where an individual sought to keep his medical 
records from the hands of an insurance company investigating a claim of fraud on the
part of the treating physician. Persönlichkeitsrecht [Personality Rights] Bundesgerichtshof in
Zivilsachen [BGHZ] [German Federal Court of Justice in Civil Matters] Apr. 2, 1947, 24 
Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshof in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 72 (F.R.G.) 12–20. 
114. Id at 18, 22, and 23. 
115. Namensrecht und sexuelle Selbstbestimmung, Bundesverfassungsgerights [BVerfG]
[Federal Constitutional Court] Dec. 6, 2005, 114 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfas
sungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 1, 2006 (F.R.G.)//BVerfG, 1 BvL 3/03 vom 6.12.2005 [Dec. 6,
2005],, Absatz-Nr. (B-46 through 71), http://www. bverfg.de/entscheidungen/ls2005120 
6_1bvl000303.html [German language only].
116. BVerfG, 1 BvR 240/04 vom 14.2.2005, Absatz-Nr. (II-10 through 29), 
http://www. bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rk20050214_1bvr024004.htm [German language
only]. 
117. Vaterschaftsauskunft, supra note 22, at 268–69 (“Das allgemeine Persönlichkeitsrecht 
umfaßt zwar auch das Recht auf Kenntnis der eigenen Abstammung” (the general right
of personality also protects the right to knowledge of one’s genetic origin)). 
118. Vaterschaftsauskunft, supra note 22, at 266. 
119. Id.
120. Ehelichkeitsanfechtung, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [German Federal 
Constitutional Court] Apr. 26, 1994, 90 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgericht 
[BVerfG] 263 (F.R.G.). 
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genetic information necessarily encompasses a right to affirmatively
obtain all relevant information in all situations.121 Under German law, 
the right to know one’s genetic origin is fundamental, but not absolute. 
The European Union developed similar concepts of the right to 
informational self-control and the right to know one’s genetic origin.
While the European Convention on Human Rights did not expressly
guarantee a right to know one’s genetic origin, courts have found that a 
right is implied from the protection of an individual’s private life.122 The
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) discussed this right and
determined that it was a fundamental right under European Union law.123 
As a result, the state has an affirmative duty to protect the right.124 
While this right includes a right to relevant information, it does not mean
that a child has an absolute right to contact his genetic relatives.125 
Similar to the approach in the German national context, the ECHR has 
held that the right is not absolute and requires state actors to balance it
against other rights, such as the privacy rights of the parents.126 
While both offer strong protection of the right to know, neither the 
Convention nor the Court provided universally accepted definitive 
guidance on how to accomplish the balance between competing rights
implicated by such an inquiry.127 In practice, each European Union 
member approaches the balance differently.  Some, such as the United 
Kingdom, give more deference to the rights of mothers while others, 
such as Germany, give more deference to the rights of the child.128 
C. The Effect of Conflicting Rights in the German Context 
In Germany, the balancing of various rights and interests involved in 
genetic parenthood led to outcomes very different from those that
occurred in the United States. For example, in the German system there
is no such thing as absolute parental anonymity in adoption
proceedings,129 and courts would likely not recognize a right to sperm 
121. Vaterschaftsauskunft, supra note 22, at 266. 
122. Besson, supra note 15, at 142. 
122. Besson, supra note 15, at 142. 
123. Id. at 151. 
124. Id. at 144. 
125. Id. at 146. 
126. Id. at 147. 
127. Id. at 150. 
128. Id. at 153. 
129. Adopted individuals in Germany are entitled to a copy of their original birth
certificate containing listing the names of the parties.  An adoptee is only required to write to
the register in the city of his birth.  79 BVerfGE 256.  A person over sixteen may access 
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donor anonymity because the child’s right to know would trump the 
parental right of privacy.130 In addition, the use of baby flaps, the
German equivalent to safe havens, is legally problematic.  Baby-flaps pit 
the right of the child to know his genetic origin against the privacy rights
of the mother and the interest of society in having unwanted children 
placed in appropriate adoptive homes.131 Such flaps are tolerated because
they serve the admirable goal of saving children, but it is unclear how 
the Federal Constitutional Court would rule if presented with a case 
where it had to directly address the conflict between the personality rights 
of the child and laudable policy of saving the life of unwanted infants.132 
While the right of the child to know his origins does not automatically 
take precedence, it is a firmly held right that must always be balanced 
against any other rights in play.  For example, the Federal Constitutional 
Court has held that when the right of the mother’s privacy and her own
informational self-determination collide with the child’s right to know 
his genetic origin, the child’s rights do not always win, but must always
be considered and must always be given great weight.133  For example, 
in a case where a child brought suit to force her genetic mother to reveal 
the names of her potential genetic fathers, the court weighed the privacy
rights of the mother in keeping her sexual history private against the
right of the child to know his or her genetic heritage.134 While the child’s
right was not absolute, the mother’s privacy right was also not 
absolute.135  Both parties’ rights and interests must be carefully considered. 
In contrast, when it comes to the father’s right to keep his sexual 
history private, German courts are much less protective and frequently
require exposure of potential genetic fathers, holding that a child’s right 
to know his genetic origin and his right to be supported by his genetic 
the public register, which keeps records on the origin of the child.  PERSONENSTANDGES
ETZ [PERSONAL STATUS LAW]§ 61(2)(1) BGBl. I S. 1188, 1189.  They also have a right 
to see their adoption file.  DAS GESETZ ÜBER DIE VERMITTLUNG DER ANNAHME ALS KIND 
UND ÜBER DAS VERBOT DER VERMITTLUNG VON  ERSATZMÜTTERN [LAW REGULATING 
ADOPTIVE PLACEMENT AND PROHIBITING SURROGACY] § 9(b)(2) BGBl. I S. 3171, 3174. 
130. MARTINY, supra note 53, at 262; SCHWAB, supra note 1, at 245, para. 491. 
131. Katherine O’Donovan, “Real” Mothers For Abandoned Children, 36 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 347 (2002). 
132. Id. at 367. 
133. Vaterschaftsauskunft, supra note 22. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. at 269. 
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father are paramount.136  Arguably the far most dramatic case illustrating 
the discrepancy between the privacy rights of mothers and those of 
potential genetic fathers is known as the Online Sex Auction Case.137 In 
this case, a German woman became pregnant after selling her sexual
services in an online auction that guaranteed anonymity to the woman’s 
sexual partners.138  When the site that hosted the auction was sued in 
order to obtain the names of the men who “won” the auction, the civil 
court in Stuttgart ruled that even though the internet website had an
interest in protecting the privacy of its users and the men had an interest
in remaining anonymous, the interests of the child in learning the 
identity of his or her genetic father and being supported by him were 
more important.139  It ordered the website to reveal the identities of the
bidders so that genetic testing could reveal the identity of the genetic 
father140 who would then likely be subject to a judicial process to declare 
him the legal father. Thus, even where German men have strong privacy
interests in keeping their sexual history private and they may have other 
children and other families that may be affected by a positive paternity 
test—the right of a child to know his genetic origin and his right to be 
supported by his genetic father usually prevail. 
IV. THE CASE OF HERRN S. AND ITS AFTERMATH
While genetic paternity has long been subject to forcible 
determination through legal process in order to protect the rights of the
child, German men have not traditionally had corresponding means of 
enforcing their right to know if a child is their genetic offspring.
Potential genetic fathers have not had a right to insert themselves into a 
child’s life and legal fathers have not had a right to know whether their 
legal children are also their genetic offspring.  Out of this context, the 
case of Herrn S. arose.141 
136. Part of the reason for this discrepancy may be that German mothers are afforded
special constitutional status and protection because of the constitutionally mandated
protection of the family.  GG art. 6(4); see Diana Zacharias, The Protection of Mothers 
in British and German Constitutional Law: A Comparative Analysis and a Contribution
to the Implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights in the Domestic 
Legal Area, 9 GERMAN L.J. 27, 45–53 (2008). 
137. Going, Going, Pregnant: Online Sex Auctioneer Ordered to Reveal Customer’s





141. Vaterschaftstests, supra note 15, at 207//BVerfGE, 1 BvR 421/05 Absatz-Nr.
(A-II-11). 
534
KAMEI (DO NOT DELETE) 5/5/2010 11:37 AM      
 





























[VOL. 11:  509, 2010] Partitioning Paternity 
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
A. The Case of Herrn S. 
Herrn S. lived with the mother of the child in question during the 
period of conception in a nichtehelicher Lebensgemeinschaft (non-
marital domestic partnership).142  Herrn S. voluntarily recognized the girl
shortly after her birth in 1994.143  In 2001, he brought an unsuccessful 
challenge to his status as legal father based on a medical report stating 
he was 90% infertile.144  The court held that the medical report did not
satisfy the evidentiary requirements necessary to overturn a voluntary
declaration of paternity and therefore dismissed his challenge.145 
In 2002, he renewed his challenge in the Amtsgericht Hildesheim
(District Court of Hildesheim).146  This time, his challenge was based on 
a clandestine DNA paternity test that he commissioned after obtaining a
piece of his legal daughter’s chewing gum.147  In addition to the DNA
test, he had expert opinion supporting his contention that there was 
100% certainty he was not the father of the child.148 
The mother of the respondent, acting as her legal representative,
objected to the introduction of the DNA report and expert opinion as 
evidence in the proceedings.149  The court excluded the DNA test results
because the test was conducted illegally under the law in force at the 
time.150  While the expert opinion could be admitted, it was insufficient
to challenge paternity.151  Even with the report, the court would not grant
“official” paternity testing because Herrn S. had no reasonable suspicion





146. Amtsgericht Hildesheim 37 F 37525/02 KL.  The Amsgericht is the German
local district court that handles civil law affairs. The family court section will be
composed of one or more judges specifically assigned. Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz [Code 
Regulating the Courts] GVG § 23(c). 
147. Vaterschaftstests, supra note 15, at 207-08//BVerfGE, 1 BvR 421/05 Absatz-
Nr. (A-II-12). Herrn S. conducted the test without the knowledge and consent of the 
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girl.152  Thus, Herrn S. had no legal way of challenging legal paternity of
a child he could not have sired. 
Herrn S. then appealed to the highest civil court in Germany, the 
Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice),153 which also affirmed the
trial court’s ruling.154 The court held that a father could not merely assert 
that he was not the genetic father and use expert testimony to prove him 
right.155  He must instead present evidence that objectively points to a strong 
possibility of another specific man being the father.156  Since the evidence
of infertility was not sufficient to meet the standards for a successful
challenge, his request for paternity testing on this ground was denied.157 
The Federal Court of Justice then addressed the mother’s refusal to
consent to testing and found that her mere refusal did not constitute 
sufficient grounds for legally cognizable suspicion of nonpaternity
required to raise a paternity challenge.158  In the Court’s view, the refusal 
to consent to DNA testing constituted a legitimate exercise of the child’s
right to informational self-determination and was not merely an exercise
of the mother’s interests.159  Because involuntary testing of the child for
any purpose interferes with the child’s constitutional right to informational
self-determination, involuntary testing is only warranted where there is 
statutory authority that adequately protects the interests of the individual 
tested and serves some overriding interest of the society at large.160 
When balanced against the right to govern one’s own information, the
father’s interest in judicial determination of nonpaternity failed to 
warrant intrusion.161 
The Federal Court of Justice further found that using a mother’s refusal to
consent to testing against her in a paternity case would undermine the
152. Id. After the decision of the Hildesheim court was finalized, the Oberlandesgericht
Celle [Provincial Court of Appeal in Celle] rejected the father’s subsequent appeal on 
similar grounds. Id. at 208//Absatz-Nr. (A-II-13).
153. The Bundesgerichtshof is the highest court for civil appeals in the land. GVG  
§ 133. In the majority of cases, it is the court of last resort. 2008 Brochure for The 
Federal Court of Justice at 1. http://www.bundesgerichtshof.de/cln_136/SharedDocs/Downloads/ 
EN/BGH/ ArchivBroschuerenEnglFuerDNB/brochure2008.html  [PDF Format].
154. Vaterschaftstests, Bundesgerichtshof in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] [German Federal 
Court of Justice in Civil Matters] Jan. 12, 2004, XII ZR 227/03 http://www.
bundesgerichtshof.de/ (select “Entscheidungen”, then from the “Kalendar” select “Jan. 2004”
and scroll to find the case) [German language only]. 
155. Id. § 1. 
156. Id. at II-2. 
157. Id. at II-1. 
158. Id. at II-2(a). 
159. Id. at II-3(a). 
160. Id.
161. Id. at II-3(e). 
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spirit and purpose of the constitutional protection of her own personality 
rights, including her privacy rights.162  This is so when the refusal occurs
after unauthorized testing has occurred and that testing shows the legal 
father is not the genetic father.163  Herrn. S’s request for paternity testing 
on this separate ground was thus denied.164 
The Federal Court of Justice also found that the result of the paternity 
test, based on illegally obtained DNA samples could not serve as 
evidence of nonpaternity nor could it serve as a basis for meeting the
stringent requirements for doubting paternity sufficient to trigger a court 
ordered test.165 This is in part because such tests do not meet basic evidentiary
standards.166  But even where a court believes that the samples and testing
results would otherwise meet the standards of evidence of German
courts, use of clandestine tests is still banned because it violates the
constitutionally protected rights of the child to control his own genetic
information, to have a stable family life, and to be supported financially.167 
While the decision was primarily concerned with the rights of the 
child, the Federal Court of Justice acknowledged that the German
Constitution guarantees a father a right to know whether he is also a 
genetic father of his legal children.168  The legal father’s right, however,
enjoys a lesser degree of protection than the rights of the child, as
evidenced by the current statutory scheme.169  The Court noted that the
German Parliament had faced the dilemma of paternity testing and chose 
to omit a requirement of DNA testing in every case, opting to favor the 
preservation of the family.170  Thus, the statutory scheme expressly 
subjugated the rights of a father to know whether his legal children are 
his genetic children to the rights of the child.171 




166. The court would be unable to verify whether the DNA samples tested actually
came from the child and alleged genetic father.  It would also be unable to determine whether 
the laboratory that conducted the tests used accepted scientific techniques in testing and 
standards in evaluating the results.  Id. at II-2(b)(aa). 
167. Id.
168. Id. at II-3(b). 
169. Id.
170. Id. at II-3(c). 
171. Id.
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While the Federal Court of Justice based its decision to subjugate the
father’s rights on legislative intent, the German Parliament was not 
content with the decision of the Federal Court of Justice.  Within weeks 
of the decision, the Free Democratic Parliamentary Group set forth a
proposal To Simplify the Method of Paternity Tests and Protect Fundamental 
Rights.172  Additionally, in April 2005, the states of Baden-Württemberg173 
and Bayern174 (Bavaria) both submitted bill requests to the Bundesrat
(Federal Council),175 the legislative chamber that represents the interests 
of the states and through which all federal level bills are initiated.176 
Herrn S. was similarly discontented with the decision of the Federal
Court of Justice. In February 2005, he lodged a constitutional complaint
against the ban on paternity testing by legal fathers without maternal 
consent.177  He claimed the ban and the decision of the Federal Court of
Justice violated his basic constitutional right of personality under Article 
2.2 and Article 2.1 of the Basic Law.178 
The Federal Constitutional Court heard the case in February 2007.179 
The court affirmed the existence of the father’s right of personality and 
mandated that the German Parliament must create a paternity-testing
process wherein the right could be protected.180 Nevertheless, the
outcome was a pyrrhic victory for Herrn S. As expected, the Federal
Constitutional Court upheld the lower courts’ decisions with respect to 
the admissibility of the DNA evidence to rebut legal paternity and 
rejected the father’s attempt to be relieved of the financial obligations of 
legal paternity.181
 172. BTDrucks 15/4727. available at http://drucksachen.bundestag.de/drucksachen/
index.php. 
173. BRDrucks 280/05, available at http://www.bundesrat.de/nn_8340/DE/parlaments 
material/berat-vorg/suche-beratungsvorgaenge-node.html?__nnn=true. 
174. BRDrucks 369/05. 
175. German federalism involves a division of federal power not only between the 
executive, legislative and judicial, but also between the federal government and
state governments.  Thus, the sixteen state governments participate directly in the 
formation of federal policy through the Bundesrat. See Bundesrat “Roles and Functions”, 
http://www.bundesrat.de/EN/Home/.
176. All federal bills are submitted first to the Bundesrat, which has the first say on
any federal legislation. Id.
177. Vaterschaftstests, supra note 15. 
178. Vaterschaftstests, supra note 15, at 311//BVerfGE, 1 BvR 421/05 at Absatz-
Nr. (A-I-17).
179. Vaterschaftstests, supra note 15. 
180. Vaterschaftstests, supra note 15, at 203//BVerfGE, 1 BvR 421/05, Ruling 1.
181. Vaterschaftstests, supra note 15, at 203//BVerfGE, 1 BvR 421/05, Ruling 2.
538
KAMEI (DO NOT DELETE) 5/5/2010 11:37 AM      
 
































[VOL. 11:  509, 2010] Partitioning Paternity 
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
The court first stated that a mere allegation that a legal father is not the 
genetic father is insufficient to sustain a paternity challenge.182 The
challenging father must present evidence to objectively show that his 
doubts about paternity are justified.183 This effectively means that a father
must show that there are specific other men who could be the genetic
father of the child.184 
The court also held that Article 2, Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law, in
conjunction with Article 1, Paragraph 1, provides a general personal 
right to know the genetic origin of one’s legal children.185 This is 
because a key aspect of individuality is awareness of self and of familial 
relationships.186  This includes the right of a child to know their genetic
origin and the right of a parent to know the genetic origin of his legal 
children.187  Thus, a legal father has the right to know whether there is a 
genetic connection between himself and his legal children.188 
While a father has a clear constitutional right to know the genetic 
origin of a legal child, the federal laws existing at the time of the decision 
afforded him no independent right of investigation.189  In German law,  
an unmarried mother was the sole holder of the child’s legal rights.190  If 
she objected to DNA testing, the father had no legal recourse to compel
testing and thus, was deprived of his right to know the genetic origin of 
his legal children.191 
To rectify this inequity, the Court held that the general right of
personality guarantees not only the right of a man to know the genetic 
origin of his legal children, but also the possibility to exercise this
right.192 The German Parliament failed to make an appropriate procedure
available by which the right to knowledge of a child’s genetic origin
could be asserted and enforced. Therefore, the fundamental rights of the 













Id. at 204//BVerfGE, 1 BvR 421/05 at Absatz-Nr. (A-I-4). 
Id.
Id.




Id. at 240//Absatz-Nr. (B-III-92). 
Id. at 240–41//Absatz-Nr. (B-III-94). 
Id.
Id. at 226//Absatz-Nr. (B-I-61). 
Id. at 226//Absatz-Nr. (B-I-62). 
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Constitutional Court thus mandated that the German Parliament create a 
process through which legal fathers who doubt that they are the genetic 
fathers of their children can obtain paternity tests.194  The procedure to
be created had to be separate and apart from a legal proceeding contesting 
paternity.195 
B. The Federal Government Responds
Within months of the Court’s decision, the federal government began 
its work.196  It eventually adopted the Gesetz zur Ergänzung des Rechts
zur Anfechtung der Vaterschaft (Law Supplementing the Right to Challenge
Paternity).197  The law separated the clarification of genetic paternity (or 
non-paternity) from the legal challenge to paternity.198  In so doing, it
effectuated changes to the federal level Family Code and the Code of 
Civil Procedure.199 
The new law effectively bifurcated paternity proceedings into those 
clarifying the genetic heritage of their legal children and those challenging
their status as legal parent.200 A legal father now has a right to bring suit
for either type or determination, or for both types of determinations.201 
While the father pursues a clarification procedure, the normal two-year 
statute of limitations for paternity proceedings is tolled and does not 
begin to run again until six months after a determination is reached.202 
For example:
A child is born in June 1998.  The Husband of the Mother is deemed to be the 
legal father by operation of law. He finds out in June 2008 that his wife had an affair
at the time of conception.  He would normally have two years to challenge legal
paternity.  So the statute of limitations would begin to run in June 2008.  However, if
he started a process to clarify genetic paternity, the statute of limitations on the 
legal paternity challenge tolls during the pendency of the clarification procedure 
and for six months after a determination. So if the gets a determination
194. Id.
195. Id. at 227–28//Absatz-Nr. (B-I-65). 
196. Many proposals were put forth including: BRDrucks 193/07 (B); BRDrucks 
549/1/07; BTDrucks 16/6649; BTDrucks 16/5370; BTDrucks 16/6561; BTDrucks 16/8219; 
BRDrucks 130/8.
197. Law Supplementing the Right to Challenge Paternity, supra note 28, at 313. 
198. Kabinett beschließt Gesetz zur Vaterschaftstellung [Cabinet Adopts Law Regarding 
Paternity] (Press Release from the Bundesministerium der Justiz) [Federal Ministry of 
Justice], July 11, 2007, http://www.bmj.de (select “Service”, then select “Pressstelle”, 







KAMEI (DO NOT DELETE) 5/5/2010 11:37 AM      
 
   
 









   












[VOL. 11:  509, 2010] Partitioning Paternity 
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
of genetic non-paternity in December 2008, the period to challenge legal
paternity begins to run again in June 2009.203 
Thus, if a father wants to pursue a clarification of genetic paternity, he 
can do so without putting his legal paternity (or his right to challenge 
legal paternity) in jeopardy.204 
While the focus of Herrn. S. was on the right of the father to clarify 
the genetic origin of his legal child, the adopted law is not limited to the 
rights of the father. The revisions to the Family Code allow clarification 
proceedings to be brought by: (1) the father against the mother and child, 
(2) the mother against the father and child, or (3) the child against both 
parents.205  The other parties in the transaction are strongly encouraged 
to give consent, but if it is not freely given, the family court can order 
that individuals submit themselves to testing.206 
Where the court is forced to intervene, it can only order testing after
consideration of potential harm to the child.207  This should include
express consideration of potential harm to the child’s existing quality of 
life and the physical and psychological vulnerabilities of the child.208 
For example, if a child is ill and the results of the test could worsen his 
condition, then the process cannot go forward.209  Such a prohibition is
not permanent, however, and the testing should be continued if the child’s 
situation were to improve sufficiently.210  The details of implementing 
this scheme were not addressed in the law or the changes to the Code,
leaving implementation largely to local authorities. 
V. ANALYSIS OF THE ALTERNATIVE AVENUES OF PROTECTING THE 
CONFLICTING RIGHTS AND ANALYSIS OF FEASIBILITY
OF EACH ALTERNATIVE
The process chosen by the German Parliament was not the only
available option. The German Parliament could have allowed for private 
203. Adapted from the example in Kabinett beschließt Gesetz zur Vaterschaftstellung, 
supra note 197. 
204. Id.
205. BGB § 1598(a)(1). 
206. BGB § 1598(a)(2). 
207. BGB § 1598(a)(3). 



















   
 
     














testing by both the mother and the legal father.  It could have decided to 
simply vest authority for testing in the local Jugendamt (Youth Authority
Office). It could have also required mandatory testing of every child
either at birth or when legal paternity is declared.  While there is an appeal
to each of these options, they present particular problems in the German
system.
A. Allowing Private Testing With Consent of Either Legal Parent
The German Parliament could have vested authority to privately test
in the legal father. The mother’s DNA is not needed for the test, so her
informational rights in her genetic information are not implicated and 
her right to privacy is no more implicated than it would be in a 
compelled procedure, or when the state initially requires her to name a 
potential genetic father.
The problem with this approach is that German law, unlike American
law, provides that the mother is the sole custodian of the rights of a 
nonmarital child.211  Her control over the child’s rights extends even to
deciding if, and to what extent, the father can have visitation with the
child.212 A nonmarital father has input into these matters only if the
mother consents and a joint custody declaration is filed.213  Despite judicial
constitutional challenges, fathers have been unsuccessful at chipping 
away mothers’ sole custodial control.214 While there are some limits on a
mother’s control,215 it is unlikely that the Federal Constitutional Court or
the German Parliament would go so far as to vest the father with the 
power to make decisions such as allowing private DNA testing.
211. BGB § 1626(a)(2). 
212. BGB § 1711(1).
213. BGB §1626(a). 
214. See Sorgeerklärungen [Clarification of Custody and Care], BVerfG, 1 BvL
20/99 vom 29.1.2003 (Jan. 29, 2003), http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/ls20030129
_1bvl002099.html [German language only].
215. See, e.g., BVerfG, 1 BvR 1444/01 vom 29.11.2005 (Nov. 11, 2005), http://www. 
bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rk20051129_1bvr144401en.html [German language only] (holding 
that a mother cannot simply decide to have her new husband adopt the child over the 
father’s objection where there was a pre-existing relationship between the legal father and
child, but declining to imbue the case with deep constitutional significance); Marie-
Therese Meulders-Klien, The Status of the Father in European Legislation, 44 AM. J.
COMP. L. 487, 504 (1996) (discussing the authority of the Youth Authority Office, not 
the mother, in deciding when to pursue a paternity action against an alleged genetic father). 
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B. Vesting Decision to Test in Neutral Third Party 
In Germany, the local Youth Protection Office, acting through the
authority of the local courts, has a right and a duty to act in the best
interests of the children in its district.216  For example, if a father refuses 
to voluntarily recognize paternity, the Youth Protection Office initiates 
paternity proceedings.217  It can even force an uncooperative mother to 
name the genetic father of the child.218  The Youth Protection Office also
has the authority to act as a legal adviser.219  The German Parliament, 
therefore, could have vested the Youth Protection Office with the 
authority to make decisions on testing paternity.  The likely reasons it
did not make this the per se solution (and instead left the matter up to 
local authorities) are (1) the primary interest of the Youth Protection
Office is protecting the child’s financial support, therefore, it has a 
vested interest in denying requests if it fears that a challenge of legal
paternity status may follow; (2) the delicate nature of the request
requires a more judicial solution than it does an administrative and
bureaucratic one; and (3) the Youth Protection Office lacks the resources
to handle the extra workload the duty would entail.  Nevertheless, it is
possible that some localities will choose this solution since they have
been vested with wide discretion in choosing implementation methods. 
C. Requiring DNA Testing or Waiver of Testing at Time of Birth, 
Acknowledgement of Paternity or Judicial 
Determination of Paternity
The final alternative solution would be for the German Legislature to 
require mandatory DNA testing or waiver of the right to test at some
discrete time point, such as birth, when an acknowledgement of paternity
is entered, or when a judicial determination of paternity is made. There 
are several problems with this approach.  First, it would be a waste of
resources, as the vast majority of cases would reveal that the alleged
216. BGB § 1666; see also Marie-Therese Meulders-Klien, The Status of the Father
in European Legislation, supra note 214, at 501. 
217. Id. 
218. Id. 
219. BGB §§ 1712–1716. 
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father is the genetic father.220  Additionally, some parties may not want
the testing for social, moral, or emotional reasons.  Further, the state
should not force testing on unwilling parties absent the infringement of 
some other party’s rights (e.g., a potential genetic father).  Finally, the
approach would be a violation of the state’s affirmative duty to protect 
the family structure.  Thus, requiring mandatory testing would be neither 
efficient nor constitutionally permissible. 
VI. ANALYSIS OF THE RELATED ISSUES THE GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURT AND LEGISLATURE DID NOT ADDRESS WITH 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
While the method chosen by the German Parliament may be the best 
choice from a set of imperfect options, it is not without its flaws.  The 
most noticeable flaw is that the lack of testing standards specified in the 
law and the delegation of the implementation of the law will create a 
lack of uniformity between cases.  Additionally, there are many rights 
and interests of the parties that are not addressed by the law and will
create further problems for German courts.  The law itself does not 
specify penalties for violation and there were no penalties in force at the
time of its adoption.221  Though penalties were later added through the
subsequent Gesetz über genetische Untersuchungen beim Menschen 
(Law Concerning Genetic Testing of Humans) (hereinafter
Gendiagnostikgesetz),222 the penalty for secret testing is only 5,000 
Euros,223 an amount insufficient to deter many fathers. A lack of
effective penalties creates little incentive for a doubtful father to submit 
to a judicial process when he can secretly test with little consequence.
Finally, while the Court addressed the issue of proof in a paternity 
proceeding, the solution leaves many dissatisfied because the high 
burden of challenging paternity remains in place. 
220. The opinion of the Ministry of Justice for Baden-Württemberg submitted in the 
case of Herrn S. asserts that in over 80% of cases the DNA test shows the legal father is 
actually the genetic father.  Vaterschaftstests, supra note 15, at 215–16//BVerfGE, 1
BvR 421/05 at Absatz-Nr. (A-II-27). 
221. Vaterschaftstests, supra note 15, at 213–14//BVerfGE, 1 BvR 421/05 at 
Absatz-Nr. (A-III-20).  The Federal Ministry of Justice notes that there are no criminal
sanctions for using the data. 
222. GESETZ ÜBER GENETISCHE UNTERSUCHUNGEN BEIM MENSCHEN [LAW CONCERNING
GENETIC TESTING OF HUMANS] [GENDIAGNOSTIKGESETZ], July 32, 2009, BGB1 Teil 1,
Nr. 50, 2529. 
223. Id. § 26(2) [Abschnitt 7]. 
223. Id. § 26(2) [Abschnitt 7]. 
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A. Lack of Uniformity 
The delegation of the actual process of bringing paternity challenges
to states and local authorities has created two problems: lack of testing 
standards inherent in the law, and lack of standards for bringing a 
request and for conveying the results to the interested parties in the least
damaging way possible.
While the German Parliament provided great detail about the process 
of bringing a proceeding to clarify a child’s genetic origin, it omitted
requirements for the actual process of conducting the test.  Giving the 
delegation to state and local authorities creates a potential for doubt
about accuracy and fairness in the testing process.  The problem is
complicated by the fact that the tests affect not only German nationals,
but also interested parents and children who may be from countries 
where the rules for custody and paternity are different.224  Thus, there is
potential for litigation on both a national and international scale.
Another problem created by delegation of implementation to state and
local authorities is the lack of set national standards for obtaining a test. 
A father in Berlin may face greater hurdles and a longer wait time than a
father in Stuttgart. In addition, there are no guidelines for conveying the 
information to the parties after the results come back.  Given the potentially 
devastating nature of the results, some federal guidelines are needed.
B. Unresolved Rights and Interests
In addition to the lack of uniformity in testing, the Federal
Constitutional Court and the German Parliament left many unresolved 
issues regarding the rights and interests of the parties.  It is possible that
the states and local authorities will create methods of addressing them,
but the difficult balancing of conflicting interests remains. 
The child has the right to be left alone and may desire not to know the 
truth about his genetic heritage. The Federal Constitutional Court rejected 
the latter concern.  It stated that the child does have a right to remain in
ignorance if he so chooses, but that should not prevent the legal father
224. See, e.g., BVerfG, 2 BvR 420/99 vom 9.3.1999 (Mar. 9, 1999), http://
www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rk19990309_2bvr042099.html [German language only]
(Swedish father, German mother); BVerfG, 2 BvR 1001/04 vom 8.12.2005 (Dec. 8, 2005), 
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rk20051208_2bvr100104.html [German language only]
(Father from Serbia and Montenegro, German mother). 
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from exercising his right to know.225 According to the Court, the right to
non-knowledge does not carry the same weight as the positive right to
know.226  While this dispenses with the child’s right to remain in 
ignorance, it does not dispense with the child’s right to be left alone. 
This right must be necessarily sacrificed in order for the father’s right to 
be exercised.
Conversely, the child may wish to know the truth, but be otherwise 
prevented from determining the truth, particularly if the legal mother and
father collude to prevent the child from having knowledge of, or contact 
with, his genetic father or other genetic relatives.  In some cases, the 
collusion is in the best interests of the child. For example, collusion is 
preferable in situations of abuse or when the genetic father is a violent 
criminal, mentally ill or otherwise unfit.  Nevertheless, it cannot be
assumed that withholding of information is always in the best interest of
the child. Given that the legal parents cannot uniformly be trusted to 
protect the child’s affirmative right to know, the best solution would 
have someone else bear the duty to protect the child’s right. The German
Parliament did not address this issue, but a scholar evaluating the 
implementation of the right in the European context suggests that the
state should bear the duty to the child to ensure that he can find out his 
true genetic heritage when he is old enough to make the decision for
himself.227  While the Federal Constitutional Court has held that the German 
state has a positive duty to ensure informational self-determination under 
its Article 6 obligations,228 it is unclear how it could effectively and 
efficiently protect this right, as mandatory universal testing is impractical
and unconstitutional.  Thus, there is likely no effective way to protect the 
child’s right to know where the legal parents prevent him from ever 
doubting the genetic connection between himself and his legal father. 
A final interest of the child that was not fully addressed by the new 
clarification procedure is the interest of the child in having ongoing
contact with those who matter to him.  Unfortunately, there is no way to 
protect this interest within the context of a clarification procedure or 
under any other judicial process.  While the state can force the mother to 
allow access by a legal father and it can force a mother and legal father
225. Vaterschaftstests, supra note 15, at 229–30// BVerfGE, 1 BvR 421/05, Absatz-
Nr. (B-I-70).
226. Id.
 227. Besson, supra note 15, at 145. 
228. For example, in the Vaterschaftstests case, the Federal Constitutional Court
delineated all of the issues of concern and then mandated that the Bundestag [German 
legislative chamber] draft a law to resolve the issues within a specified time frame.
Vaterschaftstests, supra note 15, at 243//BVerfGE, 1 BvR 421/05, Absatz-Nr. (C-II-100).
546
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to allow access by a genetic father, it cannot force a father to have 
contact with a child and it would not do so because forced contact is not 
within the best interests of the child.229 
Under German law, the mother is the sole protector of a nonmarital 
child’s rights and the guardian of his well-being.  Consequently, she has 
a vested constitutional interest in protecting her existing relationship 
with her child from disturbance.230  A clarification procedure necessarily 
negates the status quo and implicates this right.
The clarification procedure also puts the mother’s personality rights at 
stake in terms of her right to keep her sexual history private.  It is 
unclear just how much sexual history a woman must reveal if the 
paternity test turns up negative with respect to the legal father and the 
child wishes to know the identity of the genetic father.  There is no 
relevant case law by the Federal Constitutional Court that post-dates its 
decision in the case of Herrn S.  It is unclear whether the case law that
pre-dates the decision is still applicable, since the ruling is a departure 
from its previous decisions regarding the rights of the father.  The
Federal Constitutional Court in the case of Herrn S. seems to suggest
that the mother’s rights to privacy with respect to the alleged father are 
limited because she opened herself up to intrusion by alleging paternity.231 
Whether or not this limitation on the mother’s rights would apply when
the child is the challenging party is an open question.
The solution of the Bundestag also does not resolve the right of the 
father to be protected from clandestine tests conducted by the mother. 
Private tests conducted by the mother are not a prima facie violation of 
the rights of the child because she is the custodian of the child’s rights. 
So long as the child is not old enough to assert his rights on his own, no
violation has occurred. In contrast, clandestine private testing always
implicates the father’s rights.  While a taking of the father’s DNA for 
testing purposes without consent would be an unequivocal violation of 
the father’s rights, it is possible for the mother to test without directly
229. BVerfG, 1 BvR 1620/04 vom 1.4.2008 (Apr. 1, 2008), http://www.bverfg.de/ 
entscheidungen/rs20080401_1bvr162004.html [German language only]. 
230. GG art. 6(1).
231. Vaterschaftstests, supra note 15, at 233//BVerfGE, 1 BvR 421/05 at 
Absatz-Nr. (B-I-77). 
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using the father’s genetic material.  In “reverse paternity testing”232 a 
determination is made by comparing the DNA of siblings to see if the 
members of the sibling groups have the same father.  Under the current 
law, it is unclear what would happen to a mother who conducted such a 
test. 
In addition, the new law does not adequately address the rights of men
who suspect they are genetic fathers but have no legal relationship to the 
child, particularly where there is a legally recognized father.  The case of
Herrn S. would imply that these men have a right to know whether or
not they have genetic children but the strong constitutional protection of 
the family and the rights of the child would have to be weighed against 
that right. If the genetic father has no recourse to compel testing where
there is an existing functional legal family, he is left in the same 
situation as Herrn S. While it is unclear how the courts will address this 
type of case, it is clear that a case invoking the constitutional right of a 
non-legal father to determine if a child is genetically his offspring is on 
the horizon.
C. Penalties for Violation of Rights by Secret Tests and the     
Risk of Continued Secret Testing 
While the difficulty of exercising rights under the law is problematic, 
the most critical problem with the new law is the lack of effective 
penalties for clandestine tests, coupled with the difficulty in bringing
paternity challenges means that doubtful fathers have little incentive to 
do anything but continue clandestine tests.  Under the legal scheme in
force at the time the law was adopted, there were no criminal penalties for 
conducting such tests.233 While the subsequently enacted Gendiagnostikgesetz
imposed fines on any party234 who tests genetic relationships without
consent, the amount is only 5,000 euros.235  Thus, many doubtful fathers 
will continue to obtain “illegal” clandestine tests rather than submit to
judicial process.
232. For a description of reverse paternity testing see Francisc Mixich, Mihai Ioana 
& Vlad A. Mixic, Paternity Analysis In Special Fatherless Cases Without Direct Testing 
Of Alleged Father, S146 FORENSIC SCIENCE INTERNATIONAL S159 (2004). 
233. Vaterschaftstests, supra note 15, at 213–14//BVerfGE, 1 BvR 421/05 at Absatz-Nr.
(A-III-20). The Federal Ministry of Justice notes that there are no criminal sanctions for
using the data.
234. GENDIAGNOSTIKGESETZ § 26(1)7 [Abschnitt 7] (subsection (a) addresses testing by
mothers and fathers who wish to clarify the genetic origin of their children; subsection 
(b) addresses testing by the children; subsection (c) addresses testing by any other persons). 
235. Id.
548
KAMEI (DO NOT DELETE) 5/5/2010 11:37 AM      
 
   
 
                                  
 
   
 
















   
 
 
    
 
[VOL. 11:  509, 2010] Partitioning Paternity 
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
D. Ongoing Issues Involving Use of Genetic Testing in      
Legal Paternity Challenges 
Even if German fathers could have ready access to genetic testing, 
they would likely remain dissatisfied.  The Family Code starts with a 
strong presumption of legal paternity that is very difficult to overcome.236 
There is a long line of cases where fathers have attempted to overcome
the presumption and lost.  For example, the Federal Court of Justice denied
paternity challenges to men where the man asserted the existence of a
contract between him and his wife not to have children237 and even
where the mother of the child worked as a prostitute at the time of 
conception.238  If a man finds out by legal means that his legal children 
are not his genetic children, he can only recover from the genetic father 
and not from the mother of the child or the state, even if they knew he
was not the father when legal paternity was imposed.239  Where the man 
can prove that another man is the genetic father, recovery will be limited
to extreme cases, such as when the genetic father lived with the mother
and children since the dissolution of the relationship between the mother 
and legal father.240  Thus, while the Federal Constitutional Court wisely 
bifurcated the issue of genetic origin and the issue of legal paternity, it
has not heard the last of disgruntled non-genetic legal fathers. 
236. BGB § 1600(c). 
237. BGHZ 97, 372 Bundesgerichtshof, IX ZR 200/85, Apr. 17, 1986 (holding that 
even if it found that such a contract existed it would be void for interfering with the 
wife’s fundamental right to procreate, which cannot be proscriptively waived). English
language translation available at http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/transnational/
work_new/german/case.php?id=897. 
238. BGHZ, Bundesgerichtshof, XII ZR 207/03, Mar. 29, 2006 (noting that the wife 
had agreed to use condoms), http://www.bundesgerichtshof.de/ (select “Entscheidungen”, 
then from the “Kalendar” select “März 2006”, scroll to decision, click hyperlink) [German 
language only]. 
239. See, e.g., BGHZ, Bundesgerichtshof, XII ZR 144/06, Apr. 16, 2008 (holding
that mother and genetic father could not stop the test and that genetic father had to
compensate legal father for the expenses in raising the child) http://www.bundesgerichts
hof.de/ (select “Entscheidungen”, then from the “Kalendar” select “Apr. 2008”, then
scroll to decision and click hyperlink) [German language only]. 
240. Id. 
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VII. THE EXPORTABILITY OF THE GERMAN SOLUTION
TO AMERICAN COURTS
While much can be learned from the German approach, the German
solution to the disjuncture between genetic and legal paternity cannot 
simply be transplanted to American courts.  The American concept of 
the right to know genetic origin and the right to control information is 
not as fully developed as the German concept.  This is because the
German right is part of an express constitutionally protected positive 
right of personality241 whereas the American right—to the extent it is
acknowledged to exist—has been defined within the framework of the 
negative right to privacy.242  In spite of an arguably greater threat to 
personality rights,243 American courts and legislatures have been much
more hesitant to expressly protect them.244 
A. The Right to Know in the American Context 
In contrast to the strongly protected German right, the American right
to know one’s genetic heritage is a nascent concept that is being formed
almost exclusively through the lens of negative privacy rights245 in the
adoption context.  Until recently, there was no recognition of the right to
241. The German system has an agreed-upon social vision that the state must
support. Edward J. Eberle, Human Dignity, Privacy, and Personality in German and American
Constitutional Law, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 963, 975. As part of its duty to support the 
dignity of man, the German state must ensure the personality rights of the individual.  Id. 
at 968. Thus, the German right of personality and all of its constituent parts are positive
rights subject to express federal protection.  Id. at 1002. 
242. The American right to privacy is a negative right to be free from state interference.
Id. at 969.  It is, in essence, the right to be left alone.
243. For a discussion of the issue of control of genetic information, see
Yael Bregman-Eschet, Genetic Databases And Biobanks: Who Controls Our Genetic 
Privacy?, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1 (2006); June Mary Z. 
Makdisi, Genetic Privacy: New Intrusion A New Tort, 34 CREIGHTON L. REV. 965 (2001). 
244. Federal protection of genetic data is limited to specific contexts such as use of
genetic tests in the healthcare and employment context. See, e.g.,  THE GENETIC 
INFORMATION NONDISCRIMINATION ACT OF 2008, Public Law No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 
(May 21, 2008).  States provide little additional protection for the rights of individuals to
control their genetic materials and information derived from them. Only twelve states
require consent before genetic testing is performed on a sample.  Only twenty-seven require 
consent before disclosing genetic information.  Only five define genetic information as 
personal property and only one defines a DNA sample as personal property.  National 
Conference of State Legislatures “State Genetic Privacy Laws”, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/
health/genetics/prt.htm.
In contrast to the paucity of protection offered by most states, Alaska has a fairly
comprehensive genetic privacy law.  AS § 18.13.010  It provides for a private right of action 
and for criminal penalties for illegally taking or illegal use.  §§ 18.13.020; 18.13.030. 
245. Eberle at 1034. 
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know because the personality rights of the child were never considered 
in the initial adoption process and the best interest of the child was 
deemed best served by secrecy.246  This is beginning to change. 
In addition to the increase in contractually-open adoptions,247 several
state legislatures have moved toward openness in adoption, choosing 
differing approaches to the issue.  Some states grant a right to have adoption
records opened under certain specified conditions;248 some states have 
mutual consent registries or employ confidential intermediaries;249 other
states created unrestricted registries.250 
Even though states are moving toward openness in adoption, the 
“right” of a child to know his genetic origin is unsettled.  Some states do 
not recognize a “privacy” interest in knowing one’s origin.251  Others see
it as a right that outweighs the right of genetic parents’ presumed
preference for privacy.252  There is no clear majority rule on the matter
and states seem to be moving in different directions. 
246. This was not always so.  In the early days of the American republic, no right to 
know was necessary because closed adoptions were rare.  Informal and open adoptions 
were the norm in the United States until the 20th Century, when closed adoptions became
the norm. Recent demographic and social changes have led to a decrease in the number
of children available to adopt.  This in turn led a greater number of contractually-open
adoptions. RAMSEY & ABRAMS, supra note 1, at 310–11. 
247. Id. 
248. Compare In re George, 625 S.W.2d 151 (Mo. App. 1981) (holding that a fatal 
leukemia condition that could potentially be treated with a bone marrow transplant from 
a close blood relative was not sufficient good cause to open an adult adoptee’s records) 
with Doe v. The Ward Law Firm, 579 S.E.2d 303, 306 (S.C. 2003) (finding sufficient 
good cause when an adopted child faced serious mental health problems as well as 
“respiratory problems and a cyst on his brain”). 
249. For example, the state of Illinois has both a statutorily-authorized registry (750 
ILCS 50/18.04) and a statutorily-authorized confidential intermediary program (750
ILCS 50/18.3a).
250. For example, Alabama, Alaska, Kansas, Oregon and New Hampshire have open
adoption laws. ALA. CODE §§ 22-9A-12(c) & (d) (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 18.50.500(a)
(2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65–2423(a) (2003); N. H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5-C:16(1)
(2004); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 432.240(1) & (2) (2003). 
251. See, e.g., Alma Soc. Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that 
adoptees cannot challenge New York’s “closed” adoption statute because the 
state appropriately recognized the privacy interests of the natural and adoptive parents; 
the state has an interest in protecting those interests; and that neither the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection Clause, nor the Thirteenth Amendment 
rights of the adoptees would be violated). 
252. See, e.g., Doe v. Sundquist, 106 F.3d 702 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. 
Ct. 5 (upholding a Tennessee statute mandating openness of adoption records unless 
there is a veto by the interested party filed with the state because the veto provision 
provided a sufficient balancing of interests). 
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Outside of the adoption context, few American courts have dealt 
directly with the right to know one’s genetic heritage and the Supreme 
Court has not definitively ruled on the issue.  The issue was raised
indirectly in the case of Michael H. v. Gerald D.,253 but the case is 
problematic as there was no clear majority on any matter except the 
outcome of the specific case.254 Additionally, the plurality opinion
written by Justice Scalia represents a break with past precedent that 
expressly granted the genetic father constitutionally protected due
process rights.255 
While a majority of justices agreed with the disposition of the case of 
Michael H., there was no clear majority view on the justification for the
decision. Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion rests on his view that the 
marital presumption is of primary importance in deciding the matter.256 
In the face of the marital presumption, a genetic father does not have a
fundamental liberty interest in having a relationship with his genetic 
offspring.257  Thus, the plurality would deny both the child258 and the
nonmarital genetic father the right to rebut the presumption of paternity
and the right to contact in cases where another man is the legal father.259 
As several commentators have pointed out, not all genetic and adoptive parents want
records sealed. See, e.g., Rosemary Cabellero, Open Records Adoption: Finding The Missing 
Piece, 30 S. ILL. U. L.J. 291 (2006). 
253. See Michael H. v. Gerald D, 491 U.S. 110 (1949). 
254. Only Chief Justice Rhenquist fully agrees with Justice Scalia.  Id. at 112
(plurality).  Justice O’Connor and Justice Kennedy concur in the judgment with respect 
to the disposition of the case, but write separately to express disagreement with Scalia’s 
rationality and the scope of his decision.  Id. at 132 (O’Connor, J., and Kennedy, J., 
concurring).  Justice Stevens also concurred in the judgment based on the facts of the case,
but expressly disagreed with Scalia’s analysis of parental rights. Id. at 132–33 (Stevens, 
J., concurring).  Given the positions of the concurrences, Justice Brennan’s dissent is 
correct in noting that a clear majority of the court (i.e. five justices) would have afforded
the genetic father constitutional rights with respect to their genetic offspring.  Id. at 136 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
255. Justice Scalia ignored a long line of cases that would have allowed an unwed
father with a full commitment to being a responsible parent protection under the due 
process clause. As Justice Stevens points out, Justice Scalia’s point of view represents a 
break with precedent.  Id. at 133. (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Caban v. Mohammed,
441 U.S. 380 (1979); Stanley v. Ill., 405 U.S. 645 (1972)).  The Supreme Court had
previously given non-marital genetic fathers constitutionally protected interests: “[w]hen
an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by
‘com[ing] forward to participate in the rearing of his child,’ his interest in personal contact 
with his child acquires substantial protection under the Due Process Clause.”  Lehr v. 
Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983) (quoting Caban, 441 U.S. at 392) (citation omitted). 
256. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 120 (plurality). 
257. Id. at 120 (plurality). 
258. Id. at 131. 
259. Id. at 120 (plurality).
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In contrast, Justice Stevens’ concurring opinion rejected the 
plurality’s belief that a natural father can never have a constitutionally 
protected interest in his relationship with a child whose mother was
married to, and cohabiting with, another man at the time of the child’s
conception and birth.260  In citing precedent contrary to the plurality’s
rationale, Justice Stevens left open the possibility that a genetic father 
has a right to have a relationship with his genetic offspring:
“I think cases like [Stanley v. Illinois and Caban v. Mohammed]
demonstrate that enduring ‘family’ relationships may develop in unconventional 
settings. I therefore would not foreclose the possibility that a constitutionally
protected relationship between a natural father and his child might exist in a
case like this.  Indeed, I am willing to assume for the purpose of deciding this case
that Michael’s relationship with Victoria is strong enough to give him a 
constitutional right to try to convince a trial judge that Victoria’s best interest
would be served by granting him visitation rights.”261 
While it is possible to read Michael H. as a blanket proscription 
against the rights of genetic parents, neither the states nor the federal
government have followed Justice Scalia’s reasoning in the plurality 
opinion.  Under federal law, the marital presumption can be rebutted if 
genetic test results show that a man other than the mother’s husband is a
child’s genetic father.262  State courts have reached similar conclusions.263 
At a minimum, genetic fathers are afforded the procedural right granting 
them the chance to show that contact between the genetic father and
child is in the child’s best interest. 
Because the right to rebut paternity and to seek a relationship with the 
genetic child exists, the lesser included right to know of the existence of
a genetic relationship must be said to exist.  While some courts have 
denied the existence of a right to know in the context of adoption,264 a 
better view would be to hold that the right to know exists in both 
contexts, but that the balancing of rights and interests in the adoption 
context is more likely to favor a subjugation of the right to know to the 
260. Id. at 133 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
261. Id. [citations and footnotes omitted].
262. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(G) (2006). 
263. See, e.g., Callendar v. Skiles, 591 N.W.2d 182 (Iowa 1999) (holding that a 
genetic father has a paternal interest in a child born to a woman married to another man);
Louisiana ex rel. Wilson v. Wilson, 855 So.2d 913 (La. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that the 
genetic father and the mother’s husband are both obligated to pay child support as the 
husband married the mother when she was pregnant with another man’s child).
264. See, e.g., Alma Soc. Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225 (2nd Cir. 1979). 
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privacy rights of the other parties, the interest of the state in encouraging 
adoption, and the interest of the child in being adopted.265  Thus, while
American courts have approached this in a different context than 
German courts,266 a right to know exists and must be balanced against
other rights and interests in cases where paternity is in question. 
While the right to privacy has traditionally shielded the identity of 
genetic parents in the adoption context,267 courts in other contexts have
found that there is no absolute right to control information derived from 
one’s genetic material that is inherent in the right to privacy.268 
Similarly, courts have found an individual has no right to control use of 
his genetic material once it has been voluntarily given to a third party.269 
265. While the balancing process would favor subjugation of the right to know at 
the point of adoption and during childhood (as the child’s interests and rights are 
protected by the legal parents), it does not resolve the issue of adult adoptees who seek 
information on their genetic parents.  Resolving this issue is beyond the scope of this 
Comment. See generally Caroline B. Fleming, The Open-Records Debate: Balancing the
Interests of Birth Parents and Adult Adoptees, 11 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 461
(2005); Susan Whittaker Hughes, The Only Americans Legally Prohibited From Knowing
Who Their Birth Parents Are: A Rejection of Privacy Rights as a Bar to Adult Adoptees’
Access to Original Birth and Adoption Records, 55 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 429 (2007). 
266. In America, it is often genetic fathers seeking rights in the face of established
legal paternity in another man, such as the case of Michael H., 491 U.S. at 113–15.  The 
German debate was framed in the context of a legal father seeking to clarify the genetic
relationship of children he thought were sired by another man as was the case for
Vaterschaftstests, supra note 15. 
267. See, Alma Soc. Inc., 601 F.2d 1225. 
268. American courts and state legislatures have broad power to compel the taking
of genetic material and testing of the material for state ends even in the face of invasion 
of the privacy rights of others.  See, e.g., Shults v. Superior Court of Butte County, 113
Cal.App.3d 696 (1980) (holding that the state could force taking of blood samples in a 
case of welfare fraud where the issue of paternity was determinative); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE §§ 125000–125001 (West 2006) (requiring genetic screening of infants). 
In requiring genetic testing of infants, the state has the potential to invade the privacy
rights of parents as finding a genetic issue in a child will imply that one or both parents 
are the source and may be a carrier.  Alternatively, it may reveal that the alleged father is
not the genetic father of the infant. 
In addition to taking for direct state use, some states allow the data they collect to be used 
for research purposes beyond the scope of the original taking without additional consent 
from the person providing the sample.  For example, MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. ANN. 
§ 333.5431 (West 2001) expressly allows for blood specimens taken to be used for
medical research regardless of consent of the person giving the sample. 
269. See, e.g., Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. 
Supp. 2d 1064 (holding individuals retain no ownership rights over genetic materials
they provide to researchers); Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Ca., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990)
(holding that patient treated by the University retained no ownership rights in his 
discarded cells and could claim no right to profits University acquired through their use). 
But see Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Labs., 135 F.3d 1260, 1269 (9th Cir. 
1998) (“[o]ne can think of few subject areas more personal and more likely to implicate 
privacy interests than that of one’s health or genetic make-up”).
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Thus, there is no broadly recognized right to privacy in one’s genetic 
information in the American legal system.  Nevertheless, courts have 
been hesitant in many areas, including genetic information of one family
member that affects another family member. 
Where otherwise private genetic information has an impact on other 
members of the genetic family, courts have struggled to strike a balance 
between the privacy rights of the individual and the need to know the 
information by family members whose very lives may depend on timely
receipt of the information.270  Some courts have held that physicians
treating a child have a duty to warn the parents if the child has a
hereditary disease that could be passed on to future children conceived
by the couple.271  Other courts have found a reciprocal duty where the
patient-parent was diagnosed with a genetically inheritable carcinoma.272 
While courts are beginning to find the existence of a right to know
where there is a manifest threat to physical well-being, it is not yet clear
how far the right to know will extend where the situation is not so dire or 
where the principal benefit sought is psychological well-being.273 
B. The Competing Concept of Dual Legal Paternity 
Concern with the physical and psychological well-being of children
has led to a call for a dual father paradigm wherein relative legal rights 
are based on biology, intent, and social relationships.274  In the dual-
father model, the child gets the benefit of emotional, social, and financial 
support from two men as well as access to known genetic history.275 
The genetic father gains visitation rights, but the functional-social father
does not lose his legal rights over the child and may continue being the
principal decision maker, caregiver, and father figure to the child.276 
270. See generally Susan M. Denbo, What Your Genes Know Affects Them: Should 
Patient Confidentiality Prevent Disclosure of Genetic Test Results to a Patient’s Genetic
Relatives?, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 561 (2006). 
271. See, Schroeder v. Perkel, 432 A.2d. 834 (N.J. 1981) (holding that daughter’s 
physicians had a duty to inform parents that the girl had cystic fibrosis, a hereditary condition,
deprived them of the right to make an informed choice about having additional children). 
272. See Pate v. Threkel, 661 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1995). 
273. For a discussion of the psychological benefits that arise from being able to 
form one’s identity, see Besson, supra note 15, at 141. 
274. For a discussion of the two-father paradigm, see Jacobs, supra note 37, at 851. 
275. Id.
276. Id. at 852.
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Thus, the approach rejects the zero sum approach of choosing either 
genetic or functional-social paternity.
The compromise solution of dual paternity is used in the state of 
Louisiana. In Louisiana, the concept of dual paternity allows a child, or
the state on behalf of the child, to seek financial support from the genetic
father even though the child was conceived or born during a time when 
the mother was married to another man.277  Thus, a genetic father cannot
escape financial obligations to his genetic offspring merely because
another man is the legal father, nor is a legal father’s status as the legally 
sanctioned decision maker and caregiver affected by the finding of genetic
paternity in another man.278 
Dual paternity in Louisiana is not merely predicated on shared
financial responsibility.  It allows the genetic father a chance to rebut the
presumed genetic paternity of the legal father and to establish a right to
have contact with the child.279  The right to seek an avowal of paternity 
is not absolute,280 but will be recognized so long as the man either has a
pre-existing relationship with the child or seeks a relationship with the 
child after knowing or having reason to know of the existence of the 
child.281  Additionally, the right to be legally recognized as the genetic
father does not imply a right to custody, only a right to contact in the
best interests of the child.282  Where a genetic father does not act in a
timely fashion or cannot meet the minimum showing that contact is in 
the best interests of the child, he can be subject to an obligation of 
support even though he does not possess any positive parental rights.283 
Thus, while the Louisiana approach allows for the existence of two
legally recognized fathers, it does not split the legal rights flowing from 
paternity equally nor does it guarantee a genetic father an absolute right 
to contact with his genetic offspring.
277. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:236.1 (2007). 
278. State ex rel. Williams v. Howard, 898 So.2d 443 (La. Ct. App. 2004); Smith v. 
Cole, 553 So.2d 847, 854 (La. 1989). 
279. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 198 (1999).  Article 198 was enacted in 2004.  Even
before its enactment, courts recognized the right of a genetic father to institute an avowal 
action. See State ex rel. Williams v. Howard, 898 So.2d 443; Putnam v. Mayeaux, 645
So.2d 1223 (La. Ct. App. 1994). 
280. W.R.M. v. H.C.V., 951 So.2d 172, 178 (2007); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408,
414 (La. Ct. App. 1990). 
281. Smith, 566 So.2d at 414.  A genetic father who knows, or has reason to know,
that a child is genetically his but fails to assert those rights for a significant period of
time cannot later seek to establish a legal relationship.  Geen v. Geen, 666 So.2d 1192, 
1194 (La. Ct. App. 1995). 
282. Staten v. Brown, 940 So.2d 105, 110 (La. Ct. App. 2006). 
283. T.D. v. M.M.M., 730 So.2d 873, 876 (La. 1999). 
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VIII. BIFURCATED PATERNITY IN GERMANY AND LOUISIANA
WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR AMERICAN COURTS
AND LEGISLATURES
Given the conflict of rights involved in resolving the disjuncture 
between genetic and legal paternity addressed in section II(B) above, it 
seems no approach could provide a comprehensive solution that would 
please all parties. In practice, the German approach and the dual
paternity approach both leave some rights and interests unprotected. 
While the German approach best protects the informational rights of 
all parties by guaranteeing a strongly held right to know, it does not 
adequately protect the rights and interests of the child in being cared for 
and supported by all those individuals who have a genetic or legal 
connection to it because there can be only one legal father.  Nor does it
guarantee a child a right to have a meaningful relationship with a 
genetic, but not legal, father.  In contrast, the dual paternity approach, as
adopted by Louisiana, provides better protection for the child’s right to
care and support.284  Thus, the Louisiana conception of dual paternity
provides a broader protection of the underlying rights of the child to be 
cared for and supported by more than one father and the rights of father 
and child to have contact with one another. 
While the Louisiana approach is generally more protective of the 
rights of genetic fathers than the German approach, it is not more 
protective of their rights in every situation.  In situations where a father
has no meaningful access to the child, but wants only clarification of the 
child’s genetic heritage, the German right to know would provide
clarification.  Additionally, where a legal father wanted to know the genetic 
origin of his legal children but did not wish to disturb the underlying 
legal relationships, the German approach is more protective. 
The German approach is also more protective of the informational 
rights of the child, which would include a right to know genetic history 
284. In Germany, a finding of genetic non-paternity does not change underlying 
support obligations, (Vaterschaftstests, supra note 15 at 227=28//Absatz-Nr. (B-I-65)) 
whereas the Louisiana dual legal paternity approach can lead to an underlying increase in
total support provided to the child. Vaterschaftstests, note 15, at 227=28//Absatz-Nr. (B-I-
65); Smith v. Cole, 553 So.2d 847, 854 (La. 1989).  There seems to be no logical reason why
the German legislature could not mandate a dual-paternity approach.  Indeed, in Germany,
familial maintenance obligations are actually much broader than in the United States.
They include obligations between grandparents and grandchildren and run in both directions. 
BGB § 1601 (“Lineal relatives are obliged to provide each other support.”). 
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for the physical well-being of the child but also a right to know genetic 
heritage for the emotional and psychological wellbeing of the child.285 
In contrast, the Louisiana approach is focused on the father’s rights and 
is not concerned with a child’s right to know.286  Additionally, where the
right to know has been discussed in the American system, the primary
focus is on medical necessity, not self-development and related
psychological factors.287  Thus, the German approach is in some ways
much broader than the Louisiana concept of dual paternity and the nascent 
American concept of a right to know one’s genetic heritage. 
Even though neither approach provides comprehensive protection of
the rights and interests of all parties, both the German and the dual
paternity approach protect rights and interests more thoroughly than the 
majority of American jurisdictions.  Most American jurisdictions are 
only beginning to recognize informational rights and, aside from
Louisiana, do not recognize the potential for more than one legally
recognized father. One of the reasons for this is the belief that such legal
recognition would have a destabilizing effect on the family structure. 
Nevertheless, there is no evidence that recognizing two legal fathers is 
any more destabilizing than the societal norm of blended families where 
children are raised by stepfathers but maintain a legal relationship to
their genetic father.  Indeed, courts have recognized the importance of
stepparents288 and other de facto parents289 and granted them visitation
with children to whom they have played a parental role even though the 
legal parent still holds a full complement of legal rights over the child. 
Thus, courts have already acknowledged that children can have more 
285. Vaterschaftstests, supra note 15, at 225//Absatz-Nr. (B-I-58).  In the European
conception of personality rights, both adults and children have a right to know genetic 
relationships.  Thus, the majority of European countries allow children the independent right 
to now once they attain the age of majority, but some states provide them with access much
sooner. Besson, supra note 15, at 144. 
286. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 198; T.D. v. M.M.M., 730 So.2d 873. 
287. Medical, not psychological, factors underlie the right to know in the American 
adoption context. 
288. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Riggs and Hem, 129 P.3d 601, 608 (Kan. Ct. App. 
2006).
289. Some states allow non-parents custody rights under equitable doctrines.  RAMSEY
& ABRAMS, supra note 1, at 76–77; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-57-59 (granting “full
or partial custody, care, education and visitation rights” to “any interested third-party… 
upon such conditions and limitations as [the court] deems equitable”); ORE. REV. STAT. 
§ 109.119 (granting visitation rights based on emotional ties.)  Cf. WIS. STAT. § 48.92(2)
(West 2008) (allowing a judge to order post-adoptive visitation by natural parents where 
it would be in the child’s best interest). But cf. Troxel v. Granville, 520 U.S. 58 (2000)
(holding that mother could limit visitation right of genetic grandparents of child whose 
father had committed suicide and whose stepfather adopted child).
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than one parental figure in their lives and that recognition of those 
figures does not diminish the rights of the legal parent to the point where 
recognition should not be allowed.  In this regard, the dual paternity 
approach adopted by Louisiana courts is not incongruous with what 
courts are already doing in other contexts.  The dual paternity approach
merely ensures that the legal obligations and legal rights of the genetic 
father and child are secured without unnecessarily severing the rights 
and relationships of the child to a non-genetic legal parent. 
In spite of being compatible with the underlying principles of family
law, the dual paternity approach adopted by Louisiana does not offer 
complete protection for the reasons stated previously.  Thus, the best
approach for American courts and legislatures to take with respect to
paternity determinations would be to blend the dual paternity and the 
informational rights approaches.  The informational rights of both the 
fathers and the child should be recognized and given deference in any 
proceedings regarding a child’s relationship to his genetic and legal
fathers. This should not represent a means for a legal father to escape
responsibility for the financial care and support of his child.  Rather, it 
should represent an opportunity for the state, in the best interests of the
child, to acknowledge that more than one man has played a role in the 
creation of and care provided to the child, to require that both men bear 
the financial responsibilities of that relationship, and to allow a 
relationship to develop between the child and the child’s fathers.
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